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Chapter one examines workers’ labor supply decisions to estimate both the equi-
librium compensating differential for fatal risk and marginal willingness to ac-
cept fatal risk. Using new panel data from commercial fishing deckhands in the
Alaskan Bering Sea between 2003-2009, I exploit variation within the worker-firm
level in hourly earnings across fishing seasons and exogenous variation in weather-
dependent seasonal fatality rates to identify the compensating differential for oc-
cupational fatality risk. This identification approach avoids many of the common
sources of bias in the estimation of compensating differentials, including endoge-
nous job switching and unobserved worker and firm heterogeneity. Additionally,
changes in earnings caused by exogenous changes in risk within the worker-firm
level identify information about individual preferences for risk that is not conveyed
by the equilibrium wage-risk envelope. A structural labor supply model incorpo-
rates dynamic job-specific skill accumulation, which affects subsequent earnings.
The compensating differential, normalized to a value of statistical life, is estimated
to be $6.17 million using a reduced-form model and $6.75 million using a structural
model. Estimates from both models suggest that wages increase as a concave func-
tion of the level of risk. The findings imply that aversion to marginal increases in
fatal risk falls as the level of risk rises, and that the marginal VSL is a decreasing
function of the level of risk.
The second chapter uses unique data from a survey of physicians in 5 states to
provide the first comprehensive analysis of the effects of non-compete agreements
on labor markets. We estimate factors associated with the use of non-competes, the
compensating wage differential for accepting a non-compete clause, and discuss the
effects that non-compete clauses have on mobility and the geographic distribution
of primary care physicians. We find that non-competes are used frequently among
primary care physicians, and that they impose binding constraints on labor mar-
ket behavior and are associated with significant compensating wage premiums of
about 11% of wages. The analysis suggests that state-level public policies play an
important role, as we find that states with very strict enforceability of non-compete
agreements have fewer physicians per capita and higher prices for physician ser-
vices.
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CHAPTER 1
ESTIMATING COMPENSATING DIFFERENTIALS AND PREFERENCES FOR
OCCUPATIONAL FATALITY RISK
1.1 Introduction
A substantial body of theoretical and empirical literature suggests that labor mar-
kets reward workers for accepting fatal risk.1 However, the collective empirical
evidence on the size of equilibrium compensating differentials for fatal risk is ex-
tremely imprecise. This imprecision is largely a consequence of two types of endo-
geneity biases: biases caused by unobserved differences across workers and across
firms that are correlated with observed characteristics in a hedonic wagemodel, and
bias caused by the endogeneity of variation in wage-risk pairs across job-spells. The
equilibrium wage-risk locus is primarily driven by assortative matching, in part on
unobserved dimensions.2 For example, workers whose unobserved characteristics
allow them to earn higher wages are likely to choose jobs with more desirable non-
wage characteristics, causing bias in a hedonic wagemodel. The use of panel data to
overcome biases caused by the omission of worker characteristics, by identifying the
compensating differential from job switches, has exacerbated another type of bias
caused by the endogeneity of the decision by a worker to switch jobs.3 Moreover,
data limitations have prevented panel approaches from controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity across firms, as this would require variation in measured fatality rates
1See Viscusi and Aldy (2003) for a macro review of this literature.
2See, for example, Krueger and Summers (1988), Murphy and Topel (1987, 1990), Gibbons and
Katz (1991), Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999), and Kniesner, Viscusi, and Woock (2010)
3See Gibbons and Katz (1991) for empirical evidence suggesting that endogenous job mobility
biases estimates of compensating differentials.
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within the firm level.
In this paper, I use a unique new panel data set to eliminate these two most sig-
nificant econometric problems that have biased every empirical estimate of compen-
sating differentials. The estimation approach controls for unobserved heterogeneity
in worker characteristics, firm characteristics and worker-firm match effects. In do-
ing so, it separately identifies the impact of assortative matching on the equilibrium
wage-risk envelope and workers’ marginal willingness to accept (MWA) occupa-
tional fatal risk. The MWA, unlike the equilibrium compensating differential, is a
characteristic of workers’ fundamental preferences for fatal risk. The application
of preferences to the estimation of the value of statistical life can improve social
welfare relative to the use of compensating differential estimates that are affected
in particular by unobserved heterogeneity in firms’ isoprofit functions in wage-risk
space.
The data for this study come from a survey of commercial fishing deckhands
who worked in the Alaskan Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands (BSAI) fisheries be-
tween 2003 and 2009. The labor market for commercial fishing deckhands has sev-
eral unique characteristics that make it unusually well-suited for identifying the
compensating differential for occupational fatality risk. Deckhands’ earnings are
determined by revenue-sharing contracts, so seasonal changes in output prices di-
rectly cause variation in hourly earnings. Also, seasonal changes in weather condi-
tions cause exogenous and predictable changes in the fatality rate. Fishing vessels
negotiate forward contracts with processors, which specify a quantity, unit price,
and delivery date, before the start of a season. Since fatality rates are predictable ex
ante, fishing vessel captains demand output prices that are sufficiently high to com-
2
pensate their crew for the expected level of fatality risk. Consequently, fatality rates
and hourly earnings vary substantially across fishing seasons, even for workers who
remain employed at the same firm. The variation in monthly average hourly earn-
ings and fatality rates is shown in Figure 1.1. I make use of this variation within the
worker-firm level to remove bias from static unobserved characteristics of workers,
firms, and match effects. The exogeneity of weather changes that cause this varia-
tion in wage-risk pairs avoids bias from endogenous job switches that was present
in other panel studies.
Figure 1.1: Monthly Average Fatality Rate and Hourly Earnings
Sources: Survey Data, AOISS Fatality Data, NIOSH FTE Workers Data,
NOAAWeather Data
The inveterate problems in the estimation of compensating differentials are
largely due to data inadequacies. Nearly all of the US labor market studies of
the compensating differential for fatal risk rely on cross-sectional data on work-
3
ers and firms, and industry-level average fatality rate data. The large unexplained
inter-industry and inter-firm wage differentials found in many studies, such as
Krueger and Summers (1988), Groshen (1991), and Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis
(1999), suggest that unobserved firm and industry characteristics explain a substan-
tial amount of the variation in wages.4 Controlling for the unobserved differences
across firms and industries in a cross-sectional hedonic wage model is precluded by
themeasurement of fatality rates at the industry level. The pursuit of more complete
observable characterizations of workers and firms has proven to be insufficient to
alleviate concerns about omitted variable bias.5
Two studies, Brown (1980) and Kniesner, Viscusi, and Woock (2010), use fixed
effects models to reduce bias from static unobserved worker characteristics. Identi-
fication of the compensating differential comes from changes in wage-risk pairs for
workers who switch jobs across industries. Since fatal risk is generally measured
at the industry level, this identification approach introduces bias by restricting the
sample to those workers who made the potentially endogenous choice to switch
jobs and switch industries. In addition, bias from the omission of unobserved firm
effects and worker-firm match effects remains.
Removing bias from the estimation of the compensating differential for fatal risk
is particularly important because these estimates have been used to infer estimates
of the value of statistical life (VSL). The VSL is simply a normalization of the com-
pensating differential for fatal risk to a level of risk equal to one expected fatality.
The White House Office of Management and Budget requires federal agencies to
4Krueger and Summers estimate the standard deviation of industry wage differentials to be
greater than 10% after controlling for occupation, human capital, and demographic factors. Groshen
(1991) estimates the standard deviation of establishment wage differentials to be about 14%.
5See Viscusi and Aldy (2003), Purse (2004), and Bonhomme and Jolivet (2009).
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explicitly use the VSL in the benefit side of cost-benefit analyses for safety policies.
Therefore, even small biases in estimates of the compensating differential can have
large effects on public resource allocation. There are other market-based approaches
to estimating the VSL, which have very different estimation concerns, but this pa-
per focuses on improving labor market estimation of compensating differentials.
Ashenfelter (2006) describes the inability to isolate an exogenous event that affects
both wealth and fatality risk as the most important issue concerning the estimation
of the value of statistical life (VSL).
In this study, I use fatality data collected by the Alaska Occupational Injury
Surveillance System (AOISS), which include individual fatal events, rather than in-
dustry aggregates. The disaggregated nature of the data reducesmeasurement error,
and permits the estimation of seasonal changes in fatality rates, and the matching of
contemporaneous weather conditions to the date and location of fatal accidents.
Data inadequacies have not only prevented unbiased estimation of compensat-
ing differentials, they have also curtailed the scope of questions that empiricists
have been able to ask. Labor-market estimates of the VSL that are used to form
public policy should reflect the marginal willingness of workers to accept fatal risk,
which is a fundamental preference. Researchers have instead estimated the market
equilibrium relationship between wages and fatal risk, which contains almost no in-
formation about the underlying preferences of workers. This fact was articulated by
Rosen (1974) in his seminal paper on the theory of hedonic prices and implicit mar-
kets. The differences between equilibriumwage-risk pairs and workers’ preferences
for risk are caused by heterogeneity among firms in the cost of providing safety, and
the consequent assortative matching of workers and firms. Hwang, Mortensen, and
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Reed (1998) demonstrate using a model of labor market search that hedonic wage
models produce biased estimates of workers’ marginal willingness to trade wages
and non-wage amenities when firms are heterogeneous. Bonhomme and Jolivet
(2009) provide empirical evidence that supports this theory in the context of subjec-
tive job characteristics, not including fatality risk.
The difference between labor-market estimates of the preference-based VSL and
the equilibrium-based VSL is caused in part by heterogeneity in firms’ cost func-
tions. In the evaluation of the benefits of an optimal public policy, the cost functions
of firms should have no impact. Consequently, basing public policies on VSLs de-
rived from equilibrium compensating differentials is suboptimal.
A standard assumption in the majority of the empirical literature is that compen-
sating differentials for fatal risk increase linearly with the level of risk, which implies
that the VSL is constant, independent of the level of risk. This strong assumption
about the equilibrium wage-risk functions was described by Ekeland, Heckman,
and Nesheim (2004) as ‘arbitrary and misleading.’ I relax the linearity assumption
to estimate the VSL as a nonlinear function of the level of risk, and find the VSL
to be a decreasing nonlinear function of the level of risk. That is, the results sug-
gest that aversion to marginal increases in fatal risk falls as the level of risk rises.
By controlling for the effects of firm heterogeneity and assortative matching on the
equilibrium function, this result is an estimate of the marginal willingness of work-
ers in the sample to accept fatal risk. Specifically, I find that the VSL decreases from
$6.17 to $2.43 million when the fatality rate increases from 70 to 500 fatalities per
100,000 full-time equivalent worker-years.
Policymakers depend on VSL estimates from labor markets to assess the benefits
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of safety policies. Since policy options often have very different levels of risk than
the labor markets in which compensating differentials are estimated, the use of la-
bor market estimates requires the strong assumption that the VSL is independent
of the level of risk. Understanding how the marginal willingness to accept risk de-
pends on the total level of risk accepted will allow policymakers to more accurately
tailor public policies to reflect the preferences of the affected population. Adjusting
the VSL according to changes in marginal preferences is especially important for
policies that have high levels of risk relative to average occupational risks, and for
policies that affect populations uniformly, since people cannot then sort themselves
according to their preferences for risk, as they can in labor markets.
Another advantage to estimating the VSL in this empirical setting is that the sup-
port on which fatality rates vary is extremely large, extending to over 600 fatalities
per 100,000 full-time equivalent (FTE) worker-years, which is more than 150 times
larger than the average US civilian workplace fatality rate. This unusually large
amount of variation in risk facilitates the nonlinear estimation of the functional re-
lationship between the VSL and the level of fatal risk. Although the level of risk
is unusually high relative to other labor markets, there are many examples of poli-
cies that govern the acceptance of similar levels of risk. For example, the mortality
rate attributable to smoking among men in the US is 383.9 per 100,000 person-years,
which is higher than the average level of risk in BSAI fisheries.6
To summarize the advantages of the empirical approach taken in this paper, rela-
tive to the approaches taken in literature: (1) I collect a new and unique set of labor-
market data, using a survey that was designed for estimating risk-wage tradeoffs in
6Source: CDC. State-Specific Smoking-Attributable Mortality and Years of Potential Life Lost —
United States, 2000–2004. MMWR 2009;58:29-33.
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a panel setting; (2) the use of panel data on changes in wages and fatality risk within
the worker-firm level mitigates omitted variable bias by controlling for unobserved
individual characteristics, unobserved firm characteristics, and unobserved match
effects; (3) exogenous variation in wage-risk pairs within worker-firm level avoids
bias caused by the potentially endogenous choice to switch jobs; (4) I identify the
marginal willingness of workers to accept fatal risk by controlling for heterogeneity
in firm productivity and unobservedworker-firmmatch effects; (5) the support over
which fatality risk is observed extends to more that 150 times the average US man-
ufacturing fatality risk, providing an unusually large amount of variation in risk,
and facilitating the estimation of nonlinear affects of fatality risk on wages; (6) fatal-
ity rate data come from a new source, the Alaska Occupational Injury Surveillance
System, which very thoroughly reports the details and circumstances of each fatal
event in the Alaskan commercial fishing industry; and (7) using data on individ-
ual fatalities, rather than industry aggregates, reduces concern about measurement
error, allows for all of the variation in fatality rates to be used for estimation, and
allows one to estimate exogenous seasonal changes in fatality rates. These improve-
ments address the majority of the remaining concerns in the literature regarding the
econometrics of estimating compensating differentials, and provide the most com-
plete labor-market estimates yet of preferences for fatal risk.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the current state of knowl-
edge about the compensating differential for occupational fatality risk. Section 3
provides an overview of the industry and institutional labor market details that are
relevant to the model and estimation. The survey and other data are discussed in
Section 4. A structural model of dynamic labor supply with job-specific skill ac-
cumulation is presented in Section 5. Structural and reduced-form results are pre-
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sented in Section 6. Section 7 discusses the implications of nonlinear values of sta-
tistical life and preference-based approaches for the evaluation of public policies.
Section 8 concludes.
1.2 Existing Evidence on the Compensating Differential for Fatal
Risk
Viscusi and Aldy (2003) review the literature on the estimation of compensating dif-
ferentials for fatal risk in US labor markets. They describe 32 studies and summarize
estimates, normalized to VSL measures, as typically falling within the range of $3.8
to $9.0 million, although the majority of the studies they review find estimates out-
side of this range. More recently, Kniesner, Viscusi, and Woock (2010) describe the
state of knowledge about US labor market estimates of the VSL as ranging “from
about $0 to $30 million,” attributing the wide range of estimates to econometric is-
sues.
Of the 32 studies in the Viscusi and Aldy review, only one uses panel data to
control for unobserved individual heterogeneity. The primary reason for the nearly
exclusive use of cross-sectional data is the scarcity of available data with sufficiently
long panels to observe job switches. It is also unclear whether there is any benefit
to using panel data to attenuate omitted variable bias when doing so exacerbates
bias caused by endogenous job switches. Brown (1980), estimates the compensating
wage differential for fatality risk among young men in the NLSY who switch jobs
across industries. He focuses on young men in part because they are more likely to
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switch jobs, which is necessary to identify unobserved worker effects. Brown finds
inconsistent evidence of a significant compensating differential for fatality risk, and
attributes this, in part, to the inability to observe enough information about jobs. In
addition to the inadequacies of labor market data, the available data on fatality risk
have also been problematic for the estimation of compensating differentials.7
The only other longitudinal study, and the only panel study to find a robust sta-
tistically significant compensating differential for fatality risk using US labor market
data, is Kniesner, Viscusi, andWoock (2010). Their estimates, which use the longitu-
dinal structure of PSID data to identify the compensating differential from workers
who switch industries, range from about $7 to $12 million. Following the identifica-
tion approach used by Brown (1980), the authors use panel data to control for latent
static heterogeneity across workers. They describe bias from unobserved hetero-
geneity as the most important econometric issue in the estimation of compensating
differentials.
7Measures of fatality risk have come from either objective fatalities data or subjective self-reported
risk from worker surveys. Of the US labor market studies of the risk-wage tradeoff, all but three
have relied exclusively on some combination of data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the
National Traumatic Occupational Fatalities (NTOF) surveillance system, collected by the National
Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), or the American Society of Actuaries (ASA)
to construct an objective measure of fatality risk. The vast majority of these studies used BLS data,
which are industry-specific risk measures available since the late 1960s. Leigh (1989) argues that the
publicly available BLS data are biased because they only record data on firms with more than 10
workers, and other estimates suggest that about two-thirds of all workplace fatalities occur at small
firms with fewer than 10 workers. Moreover, prior to the early 1990s BLS data were only available
at aggregated 2 or 3-digit SIC codes, raising significant concern about measurement error for this
key variable. Since 1992 the BLS has collected occupational injury data through the Census of Fatal
Occupational Injuries (CFOI), which aggregates fatality rates to the 4-digit SIC level. NTOF data
have been available since 1980, and rely upon reported cause of death on death certificates. NTOF
data suggest fatality risks were about 50% higher than BLS data during the 1980s. Still, comparisons
between BLS data and NIOSH data reveal substantial differences in risk.8 ASA data are available
for a very limited number of occupations, and the risk measures differ from measures in the BLS
and NIOSH data by almost an order of magnitude for some occupations. The difficulty in accurately
estimating the level of fatal risk that workers face has contributed to the uncertainty about the VSL.
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Linearity of the wage-risk locus has been assumed by all except a few studies
in the literature,9 which have included quadratic functions of fatality risk in wage
models. These studies have all found the squared term to be negative and signifi-
cant, suggesting that the equilibrium wage-risk locus is a concave function. How-
ever, in the cross-sectional studies that found this result, it is impossible to sep-
arately identify the extent to which the estimated concavity is due to assortative
matching caused by unobserved worker and firm heterogeneity, as opposed to in-
dividual preferences for risk. Theory suggests that workers with lower aversion
to fatal risk should sort into riskier jobs, which is sufficient to produce a concave
equilibrium function.10
One paper specifically discusses the shape of preferences for fatal risk, but pro-
vides very limited empirical evidence on the subject. Viscusi and Hersch (2001)
estimate the compensating differential for non-fatal workplace injuries for smokers
and non-smokers in an attempt to understand heterogeneity in preferences for fatal
risk. They find that smokers work in riskier jobs but receive lower wage compensa-
tion for the risk they accept than do non-smokers, and they discuss the implications
of this finding on the shape of the wage-risk offer curves faced by smokers and non-
smokers. The authors reach the conclusion that smokers must face different market
opportunities than non-smokers, as the difference in equilibrium outcomes cannot
be explained by differences in preferences alone. The simultaneity of differences in
market opportunities and potential changes in preferences that are correlated with
smoking leaves insufficient variation to identify preferences for risk.
Another study of relevance to this paper is Schneier, Horrace, and Felthoven
9Viscusi (1981), Leigh and Folsum (1984), Olson (1981), and Dorsey and Walzer (1983)
10Viscusi (1992)
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(2010). This paper does not estimate the compensating differential for fatality risk,
but it does estimate the VSL using a non-labor-market approach based on fishing
vessel captains’ decisions, as agents of their firms, to risk the lives of their crew
by fishing on a given day conditional on observed short-term weather conditions.
Focusing on the Red King and Snow Crab fisheries, which are represented in the
data that I use, they estimate the VSL to be about $4.0 to $4.8 million.
1.3 Industry Background
Fisheries and related seafood processing industries are a vital part of the Alaskan
economy, especially in southwest Alaska, where seafood harvesting (20.9%) and
seafood processing (31%) jobs account for more than half of all private-sector jobs.11
The economic dependence upon seafood is even stronger in certain processing
ports. Dutch Harbor, a port in the Aleutian Islands, is not only the largest seafood
processing port in Alaska, but has also been the largest seafood port by volume in
the United States for more than twenty years.
The captains of fishing vessels in the BSAI fisheries hire deckhands and com-
pensate them with revenue-sharing agreements. Revenue-sharing levels increase
sharply with initial experience, after which they increase more slowly. The effects
of commercial fishing experience on revenue-sharing levels for various species are
presented in Table 1.1. Revenue-sharing levels vary according to the species fished
and the number of deckhands on a vessel. There are also idiosyncratic differences
in average revenue-sharing levels across vessels. These differences could be due
11Source: Robinson, Dan and Neal Gilbertson, “Fish Harvesting Employment,” Alaska Economic
Trends, December 2006.
12
to unobserved heterogeneity in firm productivity, unobserved worker-firm match
productivity, or differences in the types of workers hired by different firms.
The population of commercial fishermen discussed in this paper includes men
between the ages of 22 and 55 who either lived in, or worked on fishing vessels
that conducted business in, Dutch Harbor between 2003 and 2009. Workers in the
population are very geographically diverse, and they travel to Dutch Harbor for
fishing job spells. About 20.7% of the population of workers were estimated to live
in the state of Alaska, 64.5% lived in either California, Washington, or Oregon, and
the remainder were almost entirely from other US states.12 Most commercial fishing
deckhands held another job in addition to fishing. Typically, non-fishing jobs are
seasonal and of short-duration, although the season spent away from fishing varies
by individual.
The analysis in this paper focuses exclusively on deckhands, as opposed to other
vessel crewmembers, such as captains. The primary reason for excluding captains
is because they have the ability to make and revise expectations about earnings and
fatal risk continuously during a fishing trip, and they have the authority to change
decisions based on changes in their expectations. For example, a captain can steer
the boat to fish in safer conditions at the expense of expected revenue. Deckhands,
however, commit to working on the vessel for the duration of a fishing season, and
have less ability to change their expected earnings, expected fatality risk, or labor
supply decision once the vessel is at sea. To the extent that captains have the ability
to control both expected earnings and expected fatality risk continuously, and be-
cause the marginal tradeoffs they make are not observed by researchers, an estimate
12Author’s calculation based on longitudinally linked sales data of commercial fishing licenses
provided by the Alaska Department of Fish and Game.
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of the price of fatal risk based on analysis of ex post realizations of earnings and ex
post fatality rates that includes captains may be biased.
Fishing and crabbing boats operate intermittently throughout the year during
various regulated seasons. The reason for the intermittency is that the equipment
used to catch different species is somewhat specific, so vessels are not completely
fungible. Vessels establish forward contracts with processors before the start of a
season to deliver a specified amount of catch for a fixed price on a predetermined
date. The contracts often specify a schedule of substantial price reductions if vessels
are late for delivery. This incentive, in addition to seasonal regulations and the cost-
structure of operating a fishing vessel, cause deckhands to work very long hours,
typically 18-20 hours per day. Most vessels have six or fewer deckhands.
Prior to 2005 the fisheries had either entry limitations or aggregate catch-limits,
and vessels raced against each other to catch as much of the aggregate quota as
possible. Beginning in 2005, transferable vessel quotas were introduced into the
BSAI Crab fisheries, restricting the catch for each vessel. Many other BSAI fisheries
remain without vessel quotas. This led to consolidation of vessel capital, and the
exit of many vessels from the crab fisheries. Nonetheless, about 95 vessels remain
in operation in the crab fisheries, which have the fewest vessels. The ownership of
vessels is highly disperse, with most owners controlling a single vessel.
The turnover rate for crew members is very high, and generally decreases with
experience. Most fishermen work fairly short careers to earn high short-term re-
wards. One reason workers tend to exit the industry so quickly is that seafood har-
vesting the southwest Alaska is among the most dangerous jobs the country. In 2006
the average annual rate of fatal work-related injuries in the US was 3.9 per 100,000
15
workers. Commercial fishermen, by comparison, had an average US fatality rate of
141.7 per 100,000 full-time equivalent workers in 2006, the highest of any industry
in the country. Seafood harvesting in Alaska’s BSAI fisheries in winter months typ-
ically has average fatality rates of over 500 deaths per 100,000 full-time equivalent
workers.
More than 80% of fatalities in the BSAI fisheries occur due to hypothermia
and/or drowning. Water temperature and wave height have strong causal impacts
on fatality risk. Specifically, 74% of seasonal variation in long-run fatality rates in
the data is explained by variation in long-run monthly average water temperature
and average significant wave height. Figures 1.3 and 1.4 show monthly average
weather conditions and fatality rates. The high level of risk in the winter months is
caused by a combination of larger waves and lower water temperatures. One ad-
vantage to using this industry for estimating compensating differentials is that the
risk varies substantially across seasons. Workers are reminded of the risk of death
due to the frequency of accidents and publicity about risk levels, most notably from
the television show The Deadliest Catch. The information necessary to forecast risk is
highly visible since it is so strongly driven by seasonal weather conditions.
1.4 Data
1.4.1 BSAI Commercial Deckhand Survey
The labor market data used for this study come from a survey of men aged 22-55
who worked as commercial fishing deckhands in a BSAI fishery at any point be-
16
tween 2003 and 2009. The population of potential respondents was limited to those
deckhands who worked on vessels doing business in Dutch Harbor, or deckhands
who purchased a commercial fishing license from a vendor in Dutch Harbor. The
survey was conducted in several rounds, via mail and direct surveys conducted in
Dutch Harbor.
The survey includes questions on demographics, income, wealth, subjective risk
perceptions, and recall-based panel questions dating back to 2003 on employment
histories for all jobs, fishing and other. Regarding fishing-related employment, de-
tailed questions were asked about each trip taken, including the month(s) during
which the trip occurred, the species fished, the number of days spent fishing, the
vessel name, all aspects of the labor contract, the average number of hours worked
per day, and total earnings. Although concerns about the quality of recall data are
warranted, there is some unique reason to be optimistic about the quality of recall
data from this survey. Deckhands have been highly involved in the design, im-
plementation, and review of the policy change through which the fisheries were
transitioned from open-access to rights-based. In 2010 the policy was under review
to determine whether it has had the intended effects. Workers were very aware of
the changes that the policy had in the length of fishing seasons and earnings, and
were easily able to make comparisons between the years before the policy change,
2003-2004, and those immediately after. For this reason, recall of 2003-2006 earnings
did not seem to be problematic for respondents, and more recent data was timely
enough to also recall.
Although the data collection is still ongoing, the data used in this draft of the
paper include 133 respondents who worked a total of N=1351 fishing job spells. Of
17
these respondents, 80 were in the direct survey group completed in October 2009,
at the beginning of the Red King Crab season, and the response rate for this survey
was 62.2%. The total population of deckhands in the BSAI Red King Crab fishery
working on vessels departing fromDutch Harbor is estimated to be less 250, and the
data contain more than 30% of the relevant population of deckhands whoworked in
this fishery in 2009. The remaining 53 respondents were from two separate rounds
of mailing interviews, which had average response rates of 4.2% and 16%. The first
mailing survey frame was derived from an Alaska Department of Fish and Game
(ADFG) database of commercial fishing licenses sold, which provided the name,
mailing address, and location of license purchase for every commercial fishermen
in the state since 1988. The second mailing survey frame came from a database of
vessels registered to participate in the 2010 Opilio Crab fishing season in January
2010. The surveys were mailed directly to vessels at the beginning of the season.
18
Table 1.2: Summary Statistics: Survey Demographics
Age 37.86
[9.32]
Race
White 81:11%
Black 1:57%
Non-White Hispanic 5:62%
Asian 5:32%
Other 6:37%
Education
Less than High School Diploma 5:92%
High School Diploma/Equivalent 44:98%
Some College 38:08%
College Degree or More 11:02%
Ever Married 52:92%
At Least One Child 52:55%
Has Health Insurance 46:38%
Has Life Insurance 34:06%
State of Residency
WA 49:85%
AK 21:35%
OR 6:47%
CA 4:14%
Other US 18:19%
N Respondents 133
The mean age in the sample is 37 years, with an interquartile range from 29 to
44 years old. The sample is 81% Caucasian, and about 83% of the sample has either
a high school diploma or equivalent, or some college. Slightly more than half of
workers are married, and about the same percentage have children. Workers are of
diverse geographic origin, with only 21% coming from the state of Alaska, and about
60% from the Pacific Northwest states of California, Washington, and Oregon. The
remainder of the sample was from other US states. Only 46% of survey respondents
indicated that they have health insurance.13 Of those that do have health insurance,
13This rate of insurance coverage is comparable to the average coverage rate in the Medical Ex-
penditure Panel Survey for individuals who are not offered insurance by their employer and are not
eligible for public insurance.
19
the most common source of the insurance is a spouse’s employer.
Figure 1.2: Summary Statistics: Work Experience
S.E.
Years F.T. Work Experience
Mean 20.50 [9.96]
10th Percentile 7
50th Percentile 20
90th Percentile 35
Years Fishing Experience
Mean 16.12 [8.85]
10th Percentile 5
50th Percentile 15
90th Percentile 27
On average, each respondent worked in 10.1 different fishing seasons between
2003 and 2009. About 70% of workers in the sample had a job other than commer-
cial fishing during the panel. The mean hourly wage from outside jobs was $13.34,
which was substantially lower than the mean fishing hourly wage of $33.28.14 The
mean annual earned income from all sources in the sample was $91,285. Additional
summary statistics from the survey data on demographics, work experience, and
earnings are reported in Tables 1.2, 1.2, and 1.3.
Table 1.3: Summary Statistics: Earnings
Mean S.E.
Percent Respondents with Nonfishing Job During Panel 70:24%
Nonfishing Hourly Wage $13:34 [$8:01]
Number of Fishing Seasons per Respondent During Panel 10:16
Fishing Hourly Wage, All Years $33:28 [$28:62]
Income per Fishing Trip $34; 980 [$28; 627]
Hours Worked per Fishing Trip 1; 051:16 [829:13]
Annual Income, All Sources $91; 285 [$58; 731]
14The mean fishing wage weights job spells by their duration, measured in days.
20
To test the representativeness of the sample, I compare the sample means to
the limited available data on the population, which come from the database of
longitudinally-linked commercial fishing license sales. These population data in-
clude state of residency and the number of years in which each person purchased a
commercial fishing license in the state of Alaska. A chi-square test of the geographic
distributions of residents in Alaska, the Pacific Northwest, and other US states fails
to reject that the sample is of different geographic origin than the population, with
a p-value of 0.530. A chi-square test of the distribution of experience also fails to re-
ject that the sample is significantly different from the population, with a p-value of
0.242.15 The sample overweights fishermen who worked in crab fisheries, because
the field survey in Dutch Harbor was conducted around the beginning of the Red
King Crab season in 2009.
1.4.2 Fatality Data
Fatality risk data come from the Alaska Occupational Injury Surveillance System
(AOISS), which is a database of every work-related traumatic injury and fatality
in the state of Alaska. The AOISS is maintained by the National Institute for Oc-
cupational Safety and Health, and collects information on each injury and fatal-
ity from US Coast Guard reports, Alaska State Trooper reports, medical examiner
documents, and death certificates. The NIOSH provided a subset of this database
containing information on every commercial fishing fatality from 1990-2007. The
data include the longitude and latitude of each accident, the circumstances of the
15The estimated population distribution of experience is truncated at 19 years, due to limitations in
the commercial fishing license database. The comparison is made between the truncated sample and
truncated population distribution of experience for values between 1 year and 19 years of experience.
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accident, the date of the accident, vessel characteristics, the type of fishery, and the
number of fatalities. Monthly fatality rates are calculated by combining AOISS fa-
tality data with separate data from the NIOSH estimating the number of full-time
equivalent workers in each Alaskan fishery in each year, and data from the Alaska
State Department of Labor on the number of deckhands working in each fishery in
eachmonth of the year. The NIOSH data are used to adjust the monthly Department
of Labor counts of workers to estimate the number of full-time equivalent workers.
1.4.3 Weather Data
Historical weather data come from NOAA weather buoy station #46035, located in
the Bering Sea. Hourly weather data are available dating back to 1985. The data
used for this research include significant wave height and sea surface temperature.
Figures 1.3 and 1.4 show monthly average weather conditions and fatality rates.
22
Figure 1.3: Fatality Rate vs. Wave Height
Sources: AOISS Fatality Data, NIOSH FTE Workers Data,
NOAAWeather Data
Figure 1.4: Fatality Rate vs. Water and Air Temperature
Sources: AOISS Fatality Data, NIOSH FTE Workers Data,
NOAAWeather Data
23
Seasonal weather patterns provide easily observable ex ante signals to workers
about the fatality risk they face. Since more than 80% of fatalities are caused by
hypothermia and drowning, the weather conditions that are most likely to cause
fatal risk are waves, which cause deckhands to fall overboard or vessels to capsize,
and water temperature, which affects the amount of time available for a successful
rescue. Although the rate of fatality is extremely high, the Bering Sea fisheries are
sufficiently small that ex post monthly fatality rates are very noisy. Since weather
conditions are less noisy causal determinants of fatality rates, they are used to pre-
dict fatality rates.
Using the predicted fatality rate based on weather conditions may also be ad-
vantageous if fatality risk is endogenous in the wage equation. This could occur,
for example, if a positive shock to the spot price for seafood induces deckhands to
work longer hours or otherwise take more risks in an attempt to increase harvests
at the higher price. The ideal IV to eliminate bias from the this type of endogeneity
would be correlated with fatality risk, but uncorrelated with variables that covary
with wage shocks. Long-run monthly weather patterns in the BSAI fisheries are
useful IVs since they are strongly correlated with fatality risk but are likely to be
uncorrelated with transitory shocks to the national or global markets for seafood.
The weather variables that are included in a model of fatality rates are av-
erage significant wave height16, average water temperature, and the variance of
wave heights in the month. Other weather variables are excluded because they
are strongly correlated with the included variables, and have negligible additional
explanatory power. The mean monthly weather conditions capture the central ten-
16Average significant wave height is defined as the average wave height, from trough to crest, of
the one-third largest waves.
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dency of each variable, while the variance term is included to explain the frequency
of extreme weather events within each month, during which fatal accidents may be
more likely.
Table 1.4: Negative Binomial Model
Negative Binomial Model, Zero-Adjusted
Dependent Variable: Fatalities per 100,000 FTE Worker-Years
Mean Average Significant Wave Height (M) 0.4795 ***
[0.1598]
Variance Significant Wave Height 0.4310 ***
[0.1470]
Water Surface Temperature (C) -0.0550
[0.0359]
N Obs. 180
R2 0.484
Table 1.4 presents the results of the first-stage regression of fatality risk on the
set of weather IVs. A negative binomial model is estimated, with adjustments for
the frequent observation of zeros. The mean and variance of the distribution of
wave heights are highly significant and explain a large proportion of the variation in
fatality rates. Condition on the included wave height variables, water temperature
has relatively little explanatory power.
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1.5 Reduced-Form Estimates
Reduced-form estimation of the compensating differential for fatality risk typically
involves using cross sectional data and estimating a model such as:
wi =  + 1Hi + 2Xi + 3pi + ui
where Hi includes individual characteristics, Xi includes job characteristics for
worker i, and pi is the industry average fatality rate. The analogous panel data
approach is to estimate a fixed-effects model such as:
wit = i j + t + 4pit + ui jt
In this model i j absorbs the effects of unobserved worker, firm, and match effects,
allowing for unbiased estimation of 4 in the presence of unobservable characteris-
tics. t controls for changes that effect wages uniformly over time.
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Table 1.5: Linear Fixed Effects Models
Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wage ln(Wage) Wage ln(Wage)
Fatality Risk 2.272 *** 0.066 *** 0.893 * 0.025 ***
[0.376] [0.009] [0.433] [0.009]
Worker Effects Y Y Y Y
Worker-Firm Effects N N Y Y
Constant 28.90 *** 3.148 *** 35.204 *** 3.331
N Obs. 1351 1349 1188 1186
N Clusters 133 133 184 184
R2 0.446 0.613 0.516 0.762
Note:* Significant at the .10 level, ** significant at the .05 level, *** significant at the
.01 level. yAll models are weighted by the length of the job spell, measured in days.
All models include year effects. Standard errors are clustered at the worker level in
Models 1 and 2 and at the worker-firm level in Models 3 and 4.
Table 1.5 shows reduced-form estimates of models that are linear in the fatality
rate. The fatality rate included in the model is measured as the number of fatalities
per 1,000 full-time equivalent workers. Standard errors in both models are clustered
at the individual level. The model is weighted by the number of days in each job
spell, so that the longer job spells count more heavily than shorter spells. Model 1 is
linear in wages and fatality rate, and suggest that for every increase of one fatality
per 1,000 full-time equivalent workers the hourly wage increases by $2.272. As a
frame of reference, the average US manufacturing fatality rate is 0.039 fatalities per
1,000 FTEworkers. The implied VSL is calculated bymultiplying themeasure of risk
by the number of hours per full-time equivalent worker year, which is 2,000 hours.
The VSL implied by Model 1 is therefore $2:272  1; 000  2; 000, or $4.544 million.
If, instead, a log linear model is considered as in Model 2, the corresponding VSL
estimate depends on the level of risk. When the risk level is 4 fatalities per 1,000 FTE
workers, which is approximately theweighted sample average risk, the VSL implied
27
by Model 2 is $4.003 million. Models 3 and 4 add worker-firm effects, rather than
just worker effects, to control differences in firm characteristics. The VSL estimates
are reduced to $1.786 million and $1.517 million, respectively.
1.5.1 Nonlinear Prices of Fatality Risk
In Models 1-4, as with most estimates in the literature, the possibility that equilib-
rium compensating differentials for fatal risk are highly nonlinear functions of risk
levels is ignored. Table 1.6 shows the results of partitioned regressions similar to
Models 1-4, which allow the compensating differentials to vary across quartiles of
the distribution of fatality risks. In all four model specifications, the coefficients
on fatality rate in the lowest quartile are higher than the coefficients in the middle
quartiles, which are all higher than the coefficients on the highest quartile of risk.
The hypothesis that the coefficients are all equal is strongly rejected in Models 5 and
6, but the standard errors of the coefficient estimates are quite large as a result of
partitioning, and the null hypothesis cannot be rejected in Models 7 and 8, which
include within worker-firm effects. Still, there is convincing evidence from the parti-
tioned regression that it is worth investigating the possibility that the compensating
differential for fatal risk decreases with the level of risk.
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Table 1.7: Fixed Effects Models
Dependent Variable
(9) (10) (11) (12)
ln(Wage) ln(Wage) ln(Wage) ln(Wage)
Fatality Risk 0.2156 *** 0.2277 *** 0.1393 *** 0.1199 ***
[0.0375] [0.0346] [0.0412] [0.0367]
Fatality Risk Sq. -0.0168 *** -0.0197 *** -0.0121 ** -0.0113 ***
[0.0053] [0.0045] [0.0048] [0.0041]
Fatality Risk Cu. 0.0004 * 0.0005 *** 0.0003 ** 0.0003 **
[0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0001]
Constant 2.110 *** 2.861 *** 3.088 *** 2.704 ***
Worker Effects N Y N Y
Firm Effects N N Y Y
Worker-Firm Effects N N N Y
N Obs. 1333 1349 1186 1186
N Clusters 131 133 184 184
R2 0.232 0.633 0.631 0.766
* Significant at the .10 level, ** significant at the .05 level, *** significant at the .01 level. y Model 9
includes fishing experience, fishing experience squared, education, race, andmarital status. Standard
errors are clustered at the worker level in Models 9 and 10, and at the worker-firm level in Models 11
and 12. All models are weighted by the length of the job spell, measured in days. All models include
year effects.
To examine the nature of the nonlinearity further, Tables 1.7 and 1.9 present mod-
els that include polynomials of the fatality rate. Models 9-12 include third order
polynomials of fatality rate. The results suggest the wages are highly nonlinear
functions of the fatality rate, as the coefficients on the second and third order polyno-
mial terms are relatively large in magnitude and significant in all four specifications.
The large negative coefficient on the squared fatality rate term implies concavity in
the predicted wage function, as shown in Figure 1.5.
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Figure 1.5: Predicted Hourly Earnings vs. Fatality Rate
Model 9 is estimated using the data cross-sectionally and includes controls for
fishing experience, squared experience, education, race, year, and marital status.
This model is similar to the general model used by nearly every compensating dif-
ferential estimate in the literature, and the possibility of omitted variable bias must
be considered. InModel 10, individual effects, which control for unobserved hetero-
geneity in individual productivity, are also included. This source of bias appears to
be quite small in these data, as the parameter estimates in Models 9 and 10 are quite
similar. All other studies in the literature use models similar to either Model 9 or
Model 10. The addition of firm effects inModel 11 is therefore new; inclusion of firm
effects has a substantial impact on the estimated compensating differential, suggest-
ing that the omission of controls for unobserved firm heterogeneity in Models 9 and
10 causes very large bias in the parameter estimates. In addition to unobserved firm
effects, Model 12 adds worker-firm match effects, which control for heterogeneity
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in productivity that could arise if workers have firm-specific skills. In Model 12, all
sources of static omitted variable bias are removed. The results suggest that these
biases are very large relative to the unbiased estimate of the compensating differen-
tial.
There are several reasons why the effects of firm characteristics are especially
large in these data. First, there are no observed characteristics of firms included
in the model, so firm effects include characteristics that are commonly observed in
most data. Perhaps more importantly is the seasonal change in the composition of
vessels in these data.17 Vessel capital is not completely fungible, and so vessels op-
erate for certain seasons, but may not operate year-round. Consequently a highly
productive firm in the summer may be very different from a highly productive firm
in the winter. Seasonality of the estimated firm effects suggests that the composition
of firms across the year contributes to the relatively large impact of firm character-
istics on estimates of the compensating differential.18
17To be clear, I refer to each vessel as a firm, although in some atypical cases several vessels share
the same owner. The firm effects included in the analysis are comparable to establishment effects.
18I am grateful to Caroline Hoxby for pointing this out.
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Figure 1.6: Predicted Marginal VSL vs. Fatality Rate
Figure 1.6 shows the marginal VSL implied by Models 9-12 as a function of the
fatality rate. The estimated VSL is decreasing sharply in the fatality rate in all mod-
els. The estimated VSL in full fixed effects specification decreases from about $6.17
million at a fatality rate of 70 to about $2.43 million at a fatality rate of 500 deaths
per 100,000 FTE worker-years, a reduction of over 60%.
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Table 1.8: Box-Cox Transformation Estimates
Dependent Variable: Hourly Wage
Lambda -0.019 -0.063
[0.022] [0.021]
Fatality Rate 0.064 -0.389
Fatality Rate Sq. 0.612
Fatality Rate Cu. -0.208
Constant 3.444 2.986
N Obs. 1349 1349
Restricted Log-Likelihood, Lambda=0 -6515.2 -6494.1
LR Statistic, 21 0.76 8.59
Restricted Log-Likelihood, Lambda=1 -7464.6 -7449.9
LR Statistic, 21 1899.5 1920.1
Table 1.8 shows the parameter estimates from a Box-Cox transformation model.
wit   1

= i j + t + 5 ft + 6 f 2t + 7 f
3
t + ui jt
where i j is the coefficient for worker i at firm j and fit is the fatality rate. In a first-
order model of fatality rate, the maximum likelihood estimate of the transformation
parameter, lambda, is -0.019, and is statistically indistinguishable from zero. The
hypothesis that lambda=0, which implies that the best fitting model is log-linear in
wages, cannot be rejected. The hypothesis that lambda=1, suggesting that a linear
model in wages provides the best fit, is strongly rejected. This finding is consistent
with estimates in the literature by Viscusi and Moore (1988). The third-order model
in fatality rate has a slightly lower estimated lambda, -0.063, and the null hypothesis
that lambda=0 is rejected at the 1% significance level. Still, the estimates suggest that
the log-linear wage model has a much better fit than the linear model.
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Table 1.9: Fixed Effects Models, Specification Sensitivity
Dependent Variable
(13) (14) (15) (16)
Wage Wage ln(Wage) ln(Wage)
Fatality Risk 8.2780 *** 5.2007 ** 0.1140 ** 0.1398
[1.4899] [2.2269] [0.0507] [0.0893]
Fatality Risk Sq. -0.7317 *** -0.5355 ** -.0116 ** -0.0179
[0.1924] [0.2552] [0.0055] [0.0189]
Fatality Risk Cu. 0.0182 *** 0.0149 * 0.0003 * 0.0008
[0.0062] [0.0078] [0.0002] [0.0014]
Fatality Risk 4th 0.0000
[0.0000]
Constant 21.156 *** 30.384 *** 3.752 *** 3.728 ***
Worker Effects Y Y Y Y
Firm Effects N Y Y Y
Worker-Firm Effects N Y Y Y
Weighted Y Y N Y
N Obs. 1351 1188 1186 1186
N Clusters 133 184 184 184
R2 0.465 0.525 0.625 0.625
* Significant at the .10 level, ** significant at the .05 level, *** significant at the .01
level. y Standard errors are clustered at the worker level in Model 13, and at the
worker-firm level in Models 14, 15, and 16. Models 13, 14, and 16 are weighted by
the length of the job spell, measured in days. All models include year effects.
Table 1.9 shows estimates for variations on Models 9 and 12 to verify the robust-
ness of the results to model specification. Models 13 and 14 are linear in wages with
worker effects and worker-firm effects, respectively. The coefficients in both mod-
els have qualitatively similar implications regarding the effect of risk levels on the
marginal VSL. Quantitatively, the estimated VSL is somewhat larger based on the
results from Model 14, and decreases from about $9.0 million at a fatality rate of 70
to about $2.0 million at a fatality rate of 500 per 100,000 FTE worker-years. Model
15 is similar to Model 12, except that weights are removed. The effect of weights on
the coefficients is negligible, although removing them increases the standard errors
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slightly, and decreases the fit. In Model 16 a fourth order measure of the fatality
rate is added to Model 12. The effect is a large increase in the standard errors, and a
reduction in the overall fit of the model. The preferred model specification, consid-
ering these robustness checks and the Box-Cox estimation results, is Model 12.
1.6 A Dynamic Model of Labor Supply with Specific Skills
Empirically, the earnings of fishing deckhands increase significantly with experi-
ence. This suggests that bothwages and the accumulation of specific skills that affect
future earnings are relevant for labor supply decisions. Reduced-form approaches
to modeling the dynamic effects of skill accumulation are problematic because the
inclusion of worker-effects causes multicollinearity with experience, and the omis-
sion of worker-effects causes bias. Thus, a dynamic model is used to account for the
intertemporal consequences of labor supply decisions. This allows one to separately
model the effects of experience on the terms of labor contracts and the effects of in-
dividual heterogeneity on labor supply decisions. The model is written to capture
the salient features of commercial fishing jobs in BSAI fisheries.
The economic model of dynamic labor supply describes how heterogeneous
workers choose to supply their labor during finite careers. Heterogeneity of workers
is characterized by differences in individual utility function parameters and differ-
ences in preferences for fatality risk. Workers are assumed to be completely attached
to the labor market, and choose in each period between a fishing job or an alterna-
tive job. Fishing jobs require specific skills, so experience in fishing is not perfectly
substitutable for general work experience. The labor supply decision made in each
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period thus has dynamic implications for future labor market opportunities through
the accumulation of specific skills.
The jobs differ in hourly earnings, fatality risk, and uncertainty. Fishing jobs
have seasonally-dependent fatality risk, as well as uncertainty about total earnings
and hours worked. The alternative offer has a fixed level of fatality risk, and no
wage uncertainty. In each period t worker i chooses to work in either fishing or the
alternative job. The alternative job pays a fixed hourly wage, witm, which is worker-
specific and may depend on general work experience. Fishing jobs pay revenue-
sharing contracts that result in a stochastic hourly earnings, r f it. The revenue-
sharing offer is revealed to the worker in advance of his decision. In each period
the worker forms an expectation about the fishing vessel revenue and the number
of hours of work required conditional on the revealed contract, which allows him to
predict the distribution of his individual earnings and hours. The probability of in-
dividual i surviving period t is ˜ f t for fishermen and m, a fixed constant, for workers
who choose the alternative.
The endowment of time in each season is denoted T . If workers choose to supply
labor to a fishing vessel they have no choice over the bounded stochastic amount of
hours they will work, denoted (T   L f it). If workers choose the alternative job they
have a choice over leisure time Lmit and hours spent working (T   Lmit).
A general utility function, which depends on consumption, leisure, and survival,
is written as gi(ji)Ui(Cit; Lit), where utility over consumption, Cit, and leisure, Lit,
can take any general form Ui in which the parameters are individual-specific. The
effect of fatal risk on utility is assumed to be separable, and represented by the
function gi, with argument  equal to the probability of survival. For example, a
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Cobb-Douglas representation of utility could be written as iitC
1i
it L
2i
it . The sequential
problem corresponding to this dynamic model is:
max
(Fit ;Cit ;Lit)
TX
t=1
Fitt˜ f t
Z
Z
gi(˜ f tji)Ui(Cit; Lit)Q(z; dz) + (1   Fit+1)tmUi(Cit; Lit) (1.1)
subject to:
Cit = Fit(T   L f it)r f it + (1   Fit)wmit(T   Lmit)
The state variable is lifetime fishing experience, denoted eit, which affects the hourly
earnings of workers when they work in fishing. Control variables are: Cit is con-
sumption in season t, Lit is leisure in season t, and Fit is an indicator variable taking
value 1 when working in fishing in season t and value 0 otherwise. The state vari-
able is governed by the equation of motion: eit = eit 1 + Fit 1.
z is a stochastic vector with dimension equal to the number of sources of un-
certainty in fishing, and with joint distribution Q. The elements of z include vessel
revenue and hours worked, and the joint distribution Q is estimated conditional on
the season, species, and revenue-sharing contract. In the budget constraint, r f it can
be thought of heuristically as an hourly wage, but is determined by vessel earnings
and hours, as the expectation over the conditional distribution Q. Since gi(˜ f tji) and
does not depend on the elements of z, it can be taken outside of the expectation.
The key parameters of interest are the elements of the vector it, which charac-
terize the effect of fatal risk on utility given function g(). Normalizing the range of
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the function gi(˜ f tji) to be [0; 1]19, such that gi(m) = 1 and gi(0) = 0, one can think
of gi(˜ f tji) as the factor by which the utility of a fishing job, Ui(Cit; Lit), is discounted
due to the fatality risk.
The single-period problem faced by the worker is to choose the branch of the op-
timization problem that maximizes the lifetime sequential problem. The probability
of a worker choosing to supply his labor to a fishing vessel can be expressed as:
Pr [Fit = 1jeit; z] = Pr
h
˜ f tgi(˜ f tji)E
h
J ft (eit; z)
i
> mE

Jmt (eit; z)
i
(1.2)
where J ft and Jmt are, respectively, the suprema of the value function conditional on
choosing fishing and conditional on choosing the alternative job, in period t. That
is, either J ft or Jmt coincides with the optimal policy, and the other choice deviates
from the optimal policy in period t only.
Define:
 it =
E

Jmt (eit; z)

E
h
J ft (eit; z)
i 0BBBB@ m
˜ f t
1CCCCA
The probability of accepting a fishing job can then be written as:
Pr [Fit = 1jeit; z] = Pr
h
gi(˜ f tji)    it   "it > 0
i
(1.3)
Denoting by i the cumulative distribution of "i,
Pr [Fit = 1jeit; z] = 1   i
h
gi(˜ f tji)    it
i
(1.4)
19Since ˜ f t is a probability, the domain of g is also [0; 1]
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The expression for the probability of accepting the alternative job is similar, and the
individual likelihood function is:
Li [it] =
TY
t=1
h
Fit
h
1   i
h
gi(˜ f tji)    it
ii
+ (1   Fit)
h
i
h
 it   gi(˜ f tji)
iii
(1.5)
The parameters are estimated using a nested fixed-point algorithm. The outer al-
gorithm uses a Newton-Raphson search over the parameter space to maximize the
likelihood function, while the inner algorithm solves the dynamic programming
problem to estimate the conditional suprema of the value function, E

Jmt

and E
h
J ft
i
,
for each iteration of the parameter search.
1.6.1 Identification
This section abstracts from estimation to discuss what is identified in the structural
model. The choice to accept the fishing job in period t implies
gi(˜ f tji) > mE

Jmt (eit; z)

˜ f tE
h
J ft (eit; z)
i (1.6)
The right hand side of this equation contains only observable or estimable objects,
and identifies the sharp lower bound of gi(˜ f tji). Note that since gi(˜ f tji) is a type of
discount factor, the implied compensating differential is proportional to 1 gi(˜ f tji),
so a lower bound on gi(˜ f tji) corresponds to an upper bound on the compensating
differential and VSL. Conversely, in periods during which the alternative job is cho-
sen, the same right hand side is an estimate of the sharp upper bound on gi(˜ f tji).
That is, the acceptance of fatal risk from the fishing job identifies an upper bound
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on the compensating differential, while the rejection of a wage-risk fishing job offer
identifies a lower bound on the compensating differential. Since the equilibrium
price of fatality risk is determined by the preferences of the marginal worker, the
preferences of each individual in the sample are identified by the upper and lower
bounds of the set of possible values of gi(˜ f tji) that are consistent with their observed
choices, and need not be point-identified for all workers.
An order statistic approach to estimating the bounds on preferences suggests
that the highest value of the lower bound and the lowest value of the upper bound
identify the set of possible values of gi(˜ f tji). In this case, the precision of estimates
depends on the magnitude of variation in wages and fatality risk, and on the inci-
dence of switching in the data. Variation in wages and fatality risk for workers who
choose fishing jobs for multiple seasons will tend to shrink the identified set, all else
equal. However, the set of values of gi(˜ f tji) need not shrink to a function asymp-
totically in t, and is generally identified as a correspondence. Intuitively, this is be-
cause the market equilibrium compensating differential reflects the preferences of
the marginal worker, and need not reflect the preferences of all workers. In a panel
setting, if the preferences of a worker are always very different than the preferences
of the marginal worker, the identified set will tend to be larger for that individual.
1.6.2 Modelling Ex Ante Expectations
An important distinction to make is that between the ex ante expectations of work-
ers, which guide labor market decisions, and the ex post outcomes observed in the
survey data. The first step in estimating the structural parameters is to estimate
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workers’ ex ante expectations about revenue, hours, labor contracts, and fatality
risk. This is done using ex post data to estimate the distribution of conditional out-
comes, and using the estimated distributions to describe the ex ante expectations of
workers in the dynamic labor supply model. Since total earnings, hours worked per
season, and revenue-sharing contracts are likely to depend on one another, expecta-
tions about these outcomes are estimated jointly using a mixture model. A mixing
distribution is used to capture unobserved differences in the data generating pro-
cesses, such as vessel captain effects. The return to accumulating job-specific fishing
experience is described by an estimated Markov probability transition matrix be-
tween revenue-sharing contracts. All of the distributions are estimated separately
for each season of the year and each species. Historical weather data are used as
instrumental variables for fatality risk, so risk is also based on ex ante observable
information in the model.
Ex ante expectations about vessel revenue, hours, and labor contracts
Workers’ ability to form expectations about vessel revenue and hours worked per
season varies across seasons and species. For example, a worker in a rationalized
Red King Crab fishery knows exactly the quantity of crab that will be caught, since it
is determined by tradeable quotas and quotas are sufficiently valuable that they are
not left unused, and the output price per unit is negotiated in advance of the season.
The primary source of uncertainty for this worker is the number of hours that it will
take to earn the fairly predictable revenue. In contrast, a worker in a salmon fishery
has considerably more uncertainty in the amount of revenue that will be earned,
but can predict more confidently the number of hours that he will work, since he is
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permitted to fish for the duration of the regulated season regardless of the quantity
caught.
Revenue and hours are also likely to be correlated in many fisheries. For ex-
ample, in a rationalized fishery revenue and hours may be inversely correlated if
choosing a lucky spot leads to earning a fixed amount of revenue more quickly. In
fisheries without quantity limits one might expect a positive correlation to arise if
a boat that has found a good location tends to fish more hours per day. The de-
pendence between vessel revenue and hours worked may be unique for different
seasons of the year and species.
Using season-level data from each worker on hours worked, total earnings, and
revenue-sharing contracts, I calculate the revenue of the vessel and the number of
hoursworked. Since individual labor contractsmay change across seasons for unob-
servable reasons, and since decisions over hours worked aremade at the vessel-level
by the captain, I jointly estimate vessel revenue and hours, rather than individual
earnings and hours. Since workers with higher revenue-sharing contracts presum-
ably generate more value-added for the vessel, the distribution of hours and vessel
earnings is estimated jointly with individual revenue-sharing contracts. The joint
distribution is estimated as a mixture of Gaussian functions using maximum likeli-
hood.
Once a specific revenue-sharing contract is offered to the worker, expectations
about revenue and hours worked are estimated by integrating the joint distribu-
tion of revenue, hours, and contracts over the observed revenue-sharing level in the
revealed contract. Expected utility is then calculated over the joint distribution of
vessel earnings and hours conditional on the revealed contract, season, and species.
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Ex ante expectations about labor contracts
While vessel revenue and hours are exogenous stochastic variables, workers’ la-
bor contracts in each period depend on the state variable, eit. One can estimate the
dependence of revenue sharing levels on past fishing experience as a Markovian
stochastic process, and use this process as a model of the ex ante expectations held
by workers in each period about future levels of revenue-sharing. The process is
represented by a transition probability matrix, which workers use to form expecta-
tions over value functions in future periods.
Specifically, if there are k possible revenue-sharing contracts, the transition ma-
trix of interest, denoted P, is a k  k dimensional probability transition matrix, with
elements Pk;` equal to the probability that a worker will move from revenue sharing
contract k to contract ` with one additional year of experience. If R is the k  1 vec-
tor of the discretized levels of revenue sharing, then denote by (I = k)P(eit)R the kth
element of P(eit)R, which is the expected revenue sharing level for a worker who was
last offered contract k if he works an additional eit periods in fishing.
There are several potential approaches to estimating the transition probabilities
in P. With sufficient data, one could simply calculate the probability of observing
each transition in the data. However, since this matrix is estimated separately for
each quarter of the year and each species, there are insufficient data to estimate this
matrix unless a very course vector R is used. Instead, P is estimated using both re-
ported lifetime fishing experience and changes to fishing experience observed dur-
ing the panel. That is, the estimated elements Pk;` of the matrix P are those that
are most likely to give rise to the observed distribution of experience and revenue-
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sharing contracts. This is done by solving the minimization problem:
min
P
X
i;t
(yit   (I = 1)PeitR)2 (1.7)
s:t:
X
k
(Pk) = 18k
where y is the t1 vector of observed values of revenue-sharing for person i, ei is the
t1 vector of experience for person i, and (I = 1)PeiR indicates the first element of the
resulting k1 vector. The first element is taken on the assumption that workers with
no past experience begin with revenue sharing contracts in the first bin of the dis-
cretized revenue-sharing grid. Solving this problem minimizes the sum of squared
residuals between observed revenue-sharing levels and the levels predicted by the
transition matrix P.
Using this estimation approach, if there are no restrictions on the probabilities
there are k(k 1) free parameters to estimate. Imposing that restriction that there are
no demotions restricts the lower diagonal half of P to be zeros, leaving (k2 k)=2+k 1
free parameters. Imposing the additional restriction that promotions in each period
cannot be greater than one grid point reduces the number of free parameters to 2k 2.
In the results reported here, P is restricted to be an upper triangular matrix.
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1.7 Results
1.7.1 Structural Results
To estimate the structural model, functional forms for U and g must be specified.
Models shown in the results include utility functions that are linear in consumption,
Cobb-Douglas, and constant elasticity of substitution (CES), and g is a polynomial
function of the level of risk. The error is assumed to be distributed normally, "it 
N(0; 2i ).
Table 1.10: Functional Form Assumptions in Structural Models
Ui(Ci; Li) gi(˜ f tji)
Model Number
S1 Ci 0i
S2 Cii L
1 i
i 0i
S3 Cii L
1 i
i 0i + 1i˜ f t
S4 Cii L
1 i
i 0i + 1i˜ f t + 2i˜
2
f t
S5 [iC
i
i + (1   i)Lii ](1=i) 0i + 1i˜ f t + 2i˜2f t
The periods in the model are calendar quarters from 2003-2009. The panel is
unbalanced, with between 24 and 28 quarters of data per individual. Fatality rates
are average quarterly fatality rates matched to the timing of the species seasons, so
there is some variation in risk across species in each quarter due to differences in the
average timing of fishing trips by species. The wage in the alternative job is imputed
for each worker using data from the CPS, as described in Appendix 1.20
20For robustness, I also estimate the structural model using wages from non-fishing employment
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Table 1.11: Structural Parameter Estimates, Set Estimated i
Model (S1) (S2)
Utility Function Linear CD
i Upper Bound
Mean 0.823 0.742
Median 0.838 0.824
S.D. 0.074 0.206
i Lower Bound
Mean 0.818 0.728
Median 0.834 0.834
S.D. 0.111 0.246
i
Mean 1y 0.557
Median 1y 0.739
S.D. 0y 0.394
 0:98y 0:98y
2 0:05y 0:05y
Implied VS Li Upper Bound (Millions)
Mean 3.61 5.58
Median 2.80 2.82
S.D. 3.14 7.36
Implied VS Li Lower Bound (Millions)
Mean 3.51 5.21
Median 2.82 2.96
S.D. 2.17 6.53
y Restricted parameter
The structural parameter estimates are presented in Tables 1.11 and 1.12, and
Figure 1.7. Table 1.10 shows the functional forms used in each of the models es-
timated. Tables 1.11 and 1.12 presents maximum likelihood estimates under the
specified assumptions.
reported in the survey data, and impute the wage for those who do not report one using the sample
data. The estimated VSL differs by less than 5% under the alternative assumption.
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Figure 1.7: Structural Estimates of Identified VSL Set, Model S2, Sorted by Lower
Bound
The first two models estimate the set of values that contain the latent ˜i. Ta-
ble 1.11 presents the structural results from set-estimated models similar to those in
Table 1.12. Models S1 and S2 both assume the outside option to be the imputed CPS
wage, and the models differ only in the functional form of utility. In Model S1, the
maximum likelihood estimate of the mean upper bound on the set containing i is
0.823, while the estimated mean lower bound is 0.818. The implied upper and lower
bounds on the estimated VSL are also quite close to each other, with an estimated
mean lower bound of $3.51 million and mean upper bound of $3.61 million. Model
S2 allows for more flexible heterogeneity in preferences with a Cobb-Douglas utility
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function, and the estimated VSL set increases to between $5.21 million and $5.58
million.
Table 1.12: Structural Parameter Estimates
Model (S3) (S4) (S5)
0i
Mean 0.766 0.746 0.825
S.E. [0.022] [0.023] [0.014]
Median 0.848 0.843 0.871
1i
Mean -15.006 -10.311 -85.640
S.E. [1.338] [0.890] [6.412]
Median -12.040 -7.608 -58.338
2i
Mean 0y 2.811 5.090
S.E. 0y [0.368] [0.728]
Median 0y 1.380 4.200
i
Mean 0.695 0.621 0.555
S.E. [0.023] [0.026] [0.019]
Median 0.773 0.686 0.501
i
Mean 0y 0y 0.353
S.E. 0y 0y [0.019]
Median 0y 0y 0.340
i
Mean 0.200 0.234 0:08y
S.E. [0.019] [0.020] 0y
Median 0.119 0.147 0:08y
 0:995y 0:995y 0:995y
Implied VS Li (Millions)
Mean $4.905 $4.060 $6.750
S.E. [$0.614] [$0.559] [$0.539]
10th Pctl $0.356 $0.322 $1.452
25th Pctl $1.048 $1.194 $3.258
Median $3.559 $3.136 $5.397
75th Pctl $5.443 $5.044 $7.398
90th Pctl $9.888 $7.240 $15.243
y Restricted parameter
Since the identified sets are quite small in Models S1 and S2, Models S3-S5 pro-
vide point estimates of the parameters, which computationally allows more flex-
ibility in the functional form assumptions. In Model S3, utility is Cobb-Douglas,
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allowing heterogeneity in workers’ preferences for consumption and leisure, and gi
is linear in fatality rate. Heterogeneity in gi allows workers to have heterogeneous
preferences for risk. The mean estimate of gi is 0:766   15:006  R, where R is the
probability of death. The statistical value of life is estimated by applying the esti-
mated discount factor for fatality risk, gi, to the stream of earnings, computing the
difference between the discounted and undiscounted earnings, and dividing this
difference by the cumulative probability of fatality associated with the optimal pol-
icy. The functional form in Model S3 implies a constant VSL that is independent of
the level of risk, and the mean estimate of the individual VSLs is $4:91million, with
a 95% confidence interval of $3:68 to $6:13.
Model S5 is the most flexible model. The use of a CES utility function relaxes the
assumption implied by the Cobb-Douglas model that i = 0. Model S5 also includes
a quadratic term in gi, which allows the VSL to change with the level of risk. In this
model, the mean of gi is estimated to be 0:825   85:64  R + 5:09  R2. The implied
VSL is a decreasing function of the level of risk, due to the positive coefficient on the
quadratic term.
In comparing these estimates to others, it should be noted that reduced-form
estimates of compensating wage differentials rely upon the acceptance of risk for
identification. Therefore, in set-estimated models, the structural estimate that is
most comparable to a reduced-form estimate is the mean upper bound rather than
the mean lower bound, which is instead identified by the rejection of risk and ac-
ceptance of the outside option.
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Figure 1.8: Kernel Density of VSL, Model S5
The structural results also provide evidence on the degree of heterogeneity in
preferences for risk among workers in the sample. The sets of VSLs corresponding
to the estimated i sets for each individual in the sample are shown in Figure 1.7.
The degree of heterogeneity is very large, and the standard deviation of the esti-
mated distribution of upper bounds on the VSL is $7.36 million in Model S2; note
that this estimate is larger than the sample mean. More than half of the sample has
estimated VSLs below $3 million, while over 10% of respondents have high VSLs
above $10 million. In Model S5, the 10th percentile of individual VSLs is $2.23 mil-
lion, while the 90th is nearly $16 million. Figure 1.8 displays the kernel density of
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the distribution of estimates from Model S5 of individual VSLs.
1.7.2 The Identification of Preferences for Fatal Risk
Hwang, Mortensen, and Reed (1998) examine a prototypal model of hedonic wages
with labor market search and heterogeneous firms. They describe how a basic dy-
namic job search model causes the error term in standard labor market hedonic
wage models to violate the assumptions of the classical linear regression model.
To demonstrate simply, consider a model in which workers are homogeneous and
firms are heterogeneous. Worker i at firm j receives wage wi j and fatality rate x j. A
linear hedonic regression specification of this job search model can be written as:
wi jt =  + x jt + vi j + i jt
where  is the true marginal willingness to pay (MWP) for safety (or willingness
to accept fatal risk,) and the error term includes a classical component, i jt, and
a stationary component, vi j, which captures the unobserved heterogeneity in firm
productivity. The hedonic model provides biased estimates of the true marginal
willingness to pay, .
E() =  + E[(X0X) 1X0V]
where X is a matrix of ones and x jts, and V is a vector of vi js. The bias,
Bias = (X0X) 1X0V
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is positive under the assumption that firms that are more productive generally are
also better able to produce safety. As Hwang et al point out, in general fixed effects
cannot be used to correct this bias because a firm-effect would be perfectly collinear
with the fatality rate, x j.
However, in the current setting, changes in weather conditions cause exogenous
changes in firms’ technology for producing safety. As a result, the fatality rate en-
ters the hedonic model as xt j, permitting the inclusion of either a firm-effect v j or a
worker-firm effect vi j without causing collinearity. In this case vi j enters the model
as an intercept term rather than an error component, and  is an unbiased estimate
of the MWP.
It is unclear ex ante what shape one should expect the MWP to have in wage-risk
space. Several studies21 have estimated the wage-risk relationship to be a concave
function of risk. The concavity estimated in these studies is significant enough that
in order for it to be fully attributable to bias, the bias would have to be extremely
large and correlated with the level of risk. The estimates in this study confirm that
both the equilibrium wage-risk locus and workers’ marginal willingness to pay for
safety are decreasing in the level of fatal risk, implying that aversion to marginal
increases in risk falls as the level of risk increases. To be clear, the finding that the
MWP decreases as the level of risk increases does not imply that safety is not a
normal good; rather, the finding implies that indifference curves in wage-risk space
become flatter as the level of risk increases. The results of this are not inconsistent
with results in the literature that imply that the VSL increases as wages increase.
Kniesner, Viscusi, and Ziliak (2008) find this result using panel data to control for
21Viscusi (1981), Olson (1981), Dorsey and Walzer (1983), and Leigh and Folsum (1984)
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individual heterogeneity, although their estimates contradict most other estimates.
The combination of these findings suggests that indifference curves become steeper
as wages increase, all else equal, and flatten as the level of fatality risk increases, all
else equal.
1.7.3 (Some) Limitations of Results
Although there may be compensating wage differentials for many job character-
istics (such as the potentially undesirable characteristic of leaving one’s family to
work at sea,) most of these characteristics do not change between seasons. The pri-
mary between-season difference in non-wage characteristics, controlling for observ-
able changes, is the weather. It is plausible that differences in weather conditions
across seasons cause wage differentials that compensate for both fatality risk and
the general discomfort of working conditions. Since weather conditions are used as
instruments for fatality risk, it is not possible to separately identify compensating
differentials that may be due to changes in the weather itself, as opposed to changes
in fatal risk that accompany seasonal weather change. This is due in large part to the
high correlation between weather characteristics, making it impossible to include
weather characteristics that cause discomfort without directly affecting the fatality
rate. Attributing the estimated compensating differential entirely to fatality risk
may overstate the implied VSL. Schmidt and Zimmerman (1991), however, found a
wrong-sided slightly negative wage effect for working in unpleasant weather con-
ditions. Given this empirical evidence, and the large magnitudes of fatal risk in this
study, the assumption that fatality risk is responsible for a very large share of the
estimated compensating differential is plausible.
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Another potential source of estimation bias is due to the failure to control for
differences across seasons in the nonfatal injury rate. To the extent that the rate of
non-fatal injuries is positively correlated with the rate of fatal accidents, this omis-
sion may bias estimates upward. The publicly available data on nonfatal injuries are
insufficient to control for this variation. However, there are limitations to the ability
to control for nonfatal injuries properly in any study of compensating differentials.
One reason is that it is usually not possible to accurately characterize the costs of
being injured, which is necessary since unlike fatal injuries, nonfatal injuries are not
all of equal severity. Consequently, estimates in the literature of the compensating
differential for nonfatal risk are very imprecise. In addition, the rate of nonfatal
injury is usually highly correlated with the rate of fatal injury, so including both
variables causes collinearity. The coefficient on one of the two measures of risk is
often insignificant when both measures are included. Both Brown (1980) and Knies-
ner, Viscusi, and Woock (2010) exclude nonfatal injury risk in their estimations, so
there is no empirical US labor market evidence on how this exclusion might affect
longitudinal estimates.
The measurement of fatality risk is a chronic problem in the estimation of com-
pensating differentials. While the individual-level data used in this study are far
more accurate than aggregated industry-level data, there are still unobservable dif-
ferences in the latent fatality risk that could vary across workers and firms.
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1.8 Policy Implications
There appears to be substantial individual heterogeneity in the estimated statisti-
cal value of life. The structural estimate of the upper bound on the individual VSL
ranges from less than $1 million to well over $20 million, depending on the individ-
ual. The preferred mean estimate of the upper bound on VSL is about $6.75 million
in the structural model, and about $6.17 million in reduced-form Model 12 at a risk
level of 70 deaths per 100,000 worker-years.
Detailed information regarding the way fatality risk affects workers’ marginal
preferences for risk is of use to many policymakers. The compensating wage dif-
ferential for fatality risk in labor markets is frequently used to guide spending on
policies that affect mortality. However, mortality rates in labor markets are often
quite different from mortality rates in policy options. For example, the average US
manufacturing fatality rate is 3.9 deaths per 100,000 FTE worker-years, while the
mortality rate for US men attributable to smoking is about 384 per 100,000 person-
years. As the above results have suggested, the marginal willingness to accept a unit
of risk is dependent on the level of risk. Consequently, using VSL estimates from
manufacturing workers to inform policy that affects spending to reduce smoking
mortalities, for example, could lead to conclusions that do not represent the prefer-
ences of affected populations for fatality risk. An approach that better reflects the
preferences of the individuals accepting risk would require estimating the compen-
sating differential of the population at the appropriate level of risk. Since this is not
always possible, a second best approach is to learn about the shape of preferences
for risk in the population, which provides information that can be used to more ac-
curately extrapolate VSL estimates to levels of risk suitable for policy analysis. The
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graphs in Figure 1.6 and regression results from Model 12 in Table 1.7 can be used
to estimate proportional changes in marginal VSL when the level of risk faced a
population changes.
1.9 Conclusion
Using new survey data from commercial fishing deckhands in the Bering Sea fish-
eries of Alaska and new disaggregate data on workplace fatalities, I estimate the
compensating differential for fatality risk by exploiting seasonal variation in hourly
wages and weather conditions, which cause variation in fatality risk. This unique
source of within-worker-firm variation across brief job spells allows for fixed effects
estimation that removes bias caused by unobserved heterogeneity in worker and
firm productivity and unobserved match effects, which was previously not possi-
ble with available labor market data. The exogeneity of weather changes, and the
consequent changes in fatality rates and hourly earnings, alleviates concerns about
bias caused by endogenous switching of jobs in other panel studies. These econo-
metric advances address the majority of the remaining concerns about estimation
bias discussed in the literature. Moreover, by controlling for worker and firm het-
erogeneity, which is the basis for assortative matching, this approach permits esti-
mation of workers’ marginal willingness to accept fatal risk, which has never before
been identified in labor markets. Estimates of the marginal willingness to accept
fatal risk, a fundamental preference of workers, suggest that aversion to marginal
increases in risk decreases with the level of risk. The preference-based VSL, there-
fore, also decreases substantially with the level of risk.
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A structural discrete-choice labor supply model is used to estimate the compen-
sating differential, taking into account the dynamic effects of skill accumulation.
The structural model suggests a compensating differential, normalized as a VSL
measure, of about $6.75 million, with substantial individual heterogeneity in prefer-
ences for risk. The results also support the hypothesis that compensating differen-
tials are affected nonlinearly by the level of risk accepted by workers, and the price
of marginal risk is decreasing the level of risk accepted. The reduced-form estimate
of the VSL is about $6.17 million at a rate of 70 fatalities per 100,000 worker-years,
and decreases to about $2.43 million when the fatality increase to 500. Estimates
concur with theoretical predictions from Hwang, Mortensen, and Reed (1998) that
the bias caused by omitting unobserved firm characteristics is positive and large in
magnitude. The policy implications of this new information about individual pref-
erences for fatal are risk are that VSL estimates used to guide public policy should
be adjusted downward when the level of risk of a policy exceeds the risk at which
the VSL was estimated. The results of this paper suggest proportional magnitudes
of such adjustments that are consistent with the revealed preferences of workers for
fatal risk.
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CHAPTER 2
THE LABOR-MARKET EFFECTS OF NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS:
EVIDENCE FROM THEMARKET FOR PHYSICIANS
(JOINTWORKWITHWILLIAM D. WHITE AND CAROL SIMON)
2.1 Introduction
Non-compete agreements (NCAs), also known as covenants not-to-compete, are el-
ements of employment contracts that restrict the occupational mobility of workers
post-employment. Their primary purpose is to prevent workers from exiting a firm
and competing against it. There is substantial interest among legal scholars and pol-
icymakers in understanding how the merits of NCAs, which have the potential to
increase productivity by fostering human capital investment, compare to the costs
of restricting workers. However, there has been extremely little attention given to
them by economists. This is in part a consequence of the lack of micro-level data
that document the use of non-compete agreements in labor markets, but also be-
cause of the difficulty in estimating the mobility effects in light of the endogeneity
of the acceptance of NCAs by workers.
There is a long history of controversy surrounding the use of non-compete agree-
ments for physicians.1 Proponents of their use argue that practices should be able to
write flexible labor contracts, and that non-compete agreements are justified to pro-
tect practice investments in building relationships between patients and referring
1Di Dio (1999), Kinney (2008), and Whyte (1961)
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physicians and in recruiting physicians. Critics, including organizedmedicine, have
voiced concerns that non-compete agreements restrict patient choice, limit physi-
cian mobility, have anti-competitive effects on entry, and may restrain trade.2 In
particular, the American Medical Association (AMA) Council on Ethical and Judi-
cial Affairs3 takes the position that “Covenants-not-to-compete restrict competition,
disrupt continuity of care, and potentially deprive the public of medical services.”
The council generally discourages their use, and specifically deems them as unethi-
cal if they are excessive in geographic scope or duration or if they fail to reasonably
accommodate patients’ choices of physicians.
This paper presents a search-theoretic model of labor markets with non-compete
agreements, and uses data from the market for primary care physicians in five states
to estimate the static compensating differential associated with NCAs, the effect
they have on dynamic wage paths and the prices of physician services. These esti-
mates provide information about the productivity benefits of NCAs relative to their
effects on the monopsonistic power of firms in wage bargaining. We also present
evidence on the relationships between variation across states in the enforceability of
NCAs and variation in the mobility and geographic distribution of physicians.
The search-theoretic model frames the effects of NCAs within the context of on-
the-job search. Non-competes affect local monopsony power of firms and the model
accounts for this, following Pissarides (1994), in the determination of wages through
bargaining. The model suggests that the static effects of non-compete agreements
are to increase static wages and reduce the rate of job-to-job transitions. The re-
duction in mobility caused by non-compete agreements could occur either through
2Di Dio (1999)
3AMA (1998)
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a reduction in the rate of job offers or an increase in the cost of job-switches. The
dynamic effects of non-compete agreements are ambiguous. If non-compete agree-
ments allow practices to invest in patient-physician relationships, or otherwise in-
crease the rate of learning-by-doing, they may increase the slope of the career wage
path. Alternatively, if the increase in monopsonistic power granted to firms affects
bargaining over increases in wages over time, non-compete agreements could cause
the wage path to flatten. This suggests an empirically testable hypothesis of the
effect of non-compete agreements on productivity relative to their effects on bar-
gaining power.
To empirically test the hypotheses suggested by the model, this paper uses a
unique dataset from a survey, conducted between 2006-7, of 1,967 primary care and
pediatric physicians across 5 states. Prior to this survey there had been no system-
atic data available on the use of NCAs in healthcare markets, although anecdotal
evidence suggests that their use has been growing over time.4 In the context of
physicians, NCAs typically define a relevant set of services which physicians are
restricted from providing within a defined geographic market area for specified pe-
riod of time if the physician exits the practice.5 As a consequence, if a physician sub-
ject to a non-compete agreement leaves their practice, they are likely to face a choice
between temporarily giving up the practice of medicine, leaving their community
4Growing use over time would be consistent with a general shift in medical practice organization
in the U.S. away from solo practice and self-employment towards group practices and employee
status. As recently as 1984, Kletke, Emmons and Gillis (1996) estimate that 71% of physicians were
in solo practices or two person groups, while 76% of physicians were owners or part-owners of
their practices only 26% were employees. However, using somewhat different data, Liehaber and
Grossman (2007) estimate that as of 2004-5, the share of physicians in solo or two-person groups was
only 33% and that overall, 45% of physicians were employees, with 19% working as employees in
physician owned practices, but with 36% employed by non-physician entities, whilemore recent data
from Harris (2010) suggests that the trend toward non-physician ownership may be accelerating.
5Lowry (2003).
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or, if permitted, paying a buyout. For example, under a non-compete agreement re-
cently upheld in Kansas, a family physician leaving a medical group was prohibited
from practicing for three years in the same county as the group unless she paid the
group 25% of her earnings during this period.6
We find that the use of non-compete agreements in this labor market is extensive,
with about 45% of all physicians in the sample subject to one. In addition, we esti-
mate how practice ownership structure, geographic market characteristics, and state
laws on the enforceability of NCAs affect the use of non-compete agreements. We
estimate the compensating differential for accepting a non-compete agreement to be
approximately 11% of average hourly earnings. We find evidence that the increase
in practice costs associated with NCAs may cause consumers to face higher prices.
Specifically, we estimate that the price of an initial visit from a privately-insured
patient is about 25% higher in states with very strict enforceability of NCAs, con-
trolling for other factors that affect supply and demand. We also find that states
with very strict enforceability of NCAs have fewer physicians per capita and physi-
cians in those states are less mobile. This suggests that physicians are aware of laws
regarding NCAs, and respond to these laws by sorting into states and practices ac-
cording to their preferences for occupational mobility.
The empirical literature on labor-market effects of non-compete agreements is
very small, largely due to data limitations. Marx, Strumsky, and Fleming (2009)
use an exogenous inadvertent change in enforcement of non-compete agreements in
Michigan in 1985 and find that for inventors who produced patents the increase in
the enforcement of non-compete agreements significantly reduced mobility relative
6Sorrel, AL (2008). For other anecdotal examples see Ligos (2000) or Wilson (2006).
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to inventors in other states. To our knowledge, there has been no study on mobility
effects outside of research and development industries, and no estimates at all of the
wage impacts of non-compete agreements.
From a policy perspective, we are interested in documenting the prevalence of
non-compete agreements as a condition of physician employment and in estimating
the impact of these agreements on labor market outcomes in order to understand
their implications for social welfare. As part of physicians’ employment contracts,
non-compete agreements are typically subject to review at the state level, and the
degree to which they are enforceable varies considerably from state to state. The
findings of this study provide the important new evidence to state policymakers on
how legislation on non-compete agreements affect labor markets generally, and the
market for primary care physicians in particular.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides background on state oversight
of the use of non-compete agreements in physician practices. Section 3 presents
a theoretical search-based model of labor supply and demand with non-compete
agreements. Section 4 discusses the data and our empirical estimation approaches.
Section 5 presents our results. Section 6 concludes and discusses the possible impli-
cations of our findings for policy and future research.
2.2 State Oversight of Non-Compete Agreements
Non-compete agreements are primarily subject to review at the state level, and en-
forcement based on state case law and any applicable statutes. As of 2006, non-
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compete agreements in employment contracts for physicians were subject to court
oversight in all 50 states. In addition, in 16 states, enforcement of these clauses was
also governed by explicit statutes. Typically, courts seek to identify whether a prac-
tice has a legitimate, protectable business interest, and if so, to balance protecting
this interest against any hardships imposed on patients or physicians. One ma-
jor focus has been on protecting practice investments in developing a patient base
from competition by departing physicians for existing and/or potential patients. In
addition, courts may recognize business assets such as confidential client lists as
protectable. Arguing that markets for medical services are typically local, it is not
uncommon for courts to deem non-competes overly restrictive if they are excessive
in geographic scope, and courts have also questioned the scope of activities cov-
ered.7
There has been a very recent increase in legislative and legal attention paid to the
use of NCAs specifically for medical practitioners. In 2008 Massachusetts passed a
law banning the use of NCAs for physicians and nurses, citing the effects that they
have on medical professionals’ rights to practice and on patients’ rights to choose
practitioners. In Tennessee the Supreme Court recently banned the use of NCAs for
physicians in Murfreesboro Medical Clinic, P.A. v. Udom, which prompted the state
legislature to enact a bill that specifically allows the use of NCAs for physicians
other than emergency physicians.8 The state legislature has subsequently proposed,
but not yet passed, a bill that would expand the ban on NCAs to include all general
physicians.
Popular summaries of the enforcement of non-compete agreements, such as Wil-
7Filipp (2009)
8Tenn. Code Ann. 63-1-148
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son (2006), have been very broad, dividing states into three groups: 1) states in
which non-competes are said to be “unenforceable” (6 of the 16 states with statutes
and 1 state with case law); 2) states in which non-competes are “enforceable” (10
states with statues and 26 with case law only); and 3) 9 states in which case law is
judged uncertain. In practice, however, issues of enforcement are much more nu-
anced then these summaries suggest.9
Recently, a much more careful and precise dataset was developed and used in
Bishara (2011), which scored the interpretation of case law in each state along eight
different dimensions, and quantified the restrictiveness of non-compete agreements
in each state. Appendix 1 shows the questions and rules used in developing these
data. The ratings take into account: 1) whether or not there are state statutes that
govern the enforcement of non-compete agreements, and if so how strong they are;
2) how broadly defined an employer’s protectable interests are; 3) the strength of the
burden of proof that plaintiffs must show to enforce a non-compete; 4) whether the
signing of a non-compete covenant at the inception of an employment relationship
represents sufficient consideration for the support of the covenant; 5) whether con-
tinued employment provides sufficient consideration for a non-compete agreement
entered into after the employment relationship has begun; 6) whether changes in
the terms and conditions of employment are sufficient consideration; 7) the extent
to which courts can modify overly broad covenants not-to-compete to make them
enforceable; 8) and whether the covenant is enforceable if the employer terminates
the relationship. These far richer data allow us to test how the labor market effects
of non-compete agreements correspond to variation across states in enforceability,
9See Malsberger (2006) for a detailed review of the legal treatment of non-competes on a state by
state basis.
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and in particular dimensions of enforceability.
Table 2.1: Bishara (2011) Rating of the Restrictiveness of Non-Compete Agreements
Question Criteria Weight
Q1 Is there a state statute that governs
the enforceability of covenants not
to compete?
10 = Yes, favors strong enforcement
105 = Yes or no, in either case neutral
on enforcement
0 = Yes, statute that disfavors en-
forcement
Q2
What is an employer’s protectable
interest and how is that defined?
10 = Broadly defined protectable
interest 10
5 = Balanced approach to pro-
tectable interest
0 = Strictly defined, limiting the
protectable interest of the em-
ployer
Q3 What must the plaintiff be able to
show to prove the existence of an
enforceable covenant not to
compete?
10 = Weak burden of proof on
plaintiff (employer) 5
5 = Balanced burden of proof on
plaintiff
0 = Strong burden of proof on
plaintiff
Q3a Does the signing of a covenant not
to compete at the inception of the
employment relationship provide
sufficient consideration to support
the covenant?
10 = Yes, start of employment
always sufficient to support any
CNC
5
5 = Sometimes sufficient to support
CNC
0 = Never sufficient as considera-
tion to support CNC
Q3b Will a change in the terms and
conditions of employment provide
sufficient consideration to support
a covenant not to compete entered
into after the employment
relationship has begun?
10 = Continued employment al-
ways sufficient to support any
CNC
5
5 = Only change in terms sufficient
to support CNC
0 =Neither continued employment
nor change in terms sufficient to
support CNC
Continued on next page
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Continued from previous page
Question Criteria Weight
Q3c Will continued employment
provide sufficient consideration to
support a covenant not to compete
entered into after the employment
relationship has begun?
10 = Continued employment al-
ways sufficient to support any
CNC
5
5 = Only change in terms sufficient
to support CNC
0 =Neither continued employment
nor change in terms sufficient to
support CNC
Q4 If the restrictions in the covenant
not to compete are unenforceable
because they are overbroad, are
the courts permitted to modify the
covenant to make the restrictions
more narrow and to make the
covenant enforceable? If so, under
what circumstances will the courts
allow reduction and what form of
reduction will the courts permit?
10 = Judicial modification allowed,
broad circumstances and restric-
tions to maximum enforcement al-
lowed
10
5 = Blue pencil allowed, balanced
circumstances and restrictions to
middle ground of allowed enforce-
ment
0 = Blue pencil or modification not
allowed
Q8 If the employer teminates the
employment relationship, is the
covenant enforceable?
10 = Enforceable if employer termi-
nates 10
5 = Enforceable in some circum-
stances
0 =Not enforceable if employer ter-
minates
Focusing on the five states in our data, California, Illinois, Georgia, Pennsylva-
nia and Texas, Bishara (2011) ranks these states as 50th, 4th, 43rd, 23rd, and 32nd,
respectively, in strength of enforcement. This provides substantial variation across
states within our sample, and the quantified ratings range from 31 in California to
430 in Illinois. Table 2.2 shows the ratings from Bishara (2011) for the states in our
sample.
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Table 2.2: Bishara (2011) Summary of State Restrictiveness of Non-Compete Agree-
ments
C
al
ifo
rn
ia
G
eo
rg
ia
Ill
in
oi
s
Pe
nn
sy
lv
an
ia
Te
xa
s
Average Total Score 31 285 430 365 350
State Rank* 50 43 4 23 32
Q1 10 30 50 50 80
Q2 10 70 70 70 80
Q3 5 25 30 20 35
Q3(a) 0 50 50 50 20
Q3(b&c) 0 50 50 25 15
Q4 0 0 90 80 60
Q8 0 60 90 70 60
Note: *Out of 51, including D.C.. 1 is the most restrictive.
Source: Bishara (2011). See Table ?? for explanation of question numbers.
2.3 Economic Model
Non-compete agreements have the potential to affect both labor supply and labor
demand. In deciding whether or not to require non-compete agreements as a con-
dition of employment, a practice’s problem is to weigh anticipated benefits associ-
ated with NCAs against anticipated costs, which may depend on physician, practice
and market characteristics, including the regulatory environment. On the physician
side, non-compete clauses could affect both the extensive and intensive margins
of labor supply. On the extensive margin, the exit barrier created by non-compete
agreements should tend to reduce mobility. However, variation in the level of re-
strictiveness of NCAs across states could lead to sorting across states, so that states
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with strongly enforceable NCAs have either fewer physicians or physicians with on
average weaker preferences for occupational mobility. Thus selection across states
could act against a potential decrease in mobility caused by NCAs. This net effect
on labor supply in a local labor market is ambiguous.
An intensive margin effect could occur if, for example, non-compete clauses af-
fected the elasticity of labor supply. One possible mechanism through which this
could occur is if the exit barrier created by a non-compete clause gave firms some
monopsonistic power that allowed them to flatten the dynamic wage profile of a
physician. All else equal, if learning by doing has less affect on the wage profile, the
static elasticity of labor supply is likely to be smaller
2.3.1 A Labor Search Model with Non-Compete Agreements
The following is a simple labor search model that describes the theoretical effects of
non-compete agreements on labor supply and labor demand.
Labor Supply with Non-Compete Agreements
Assume that there is no unemployment, so all transitions are job-to-job, requiring
on-the-job search.10 Suppose workers receive offers at the rate a, and that the frac-
tion of firms whose offers have NCAs is . Since exiting a job with an NCA requires
10The unemployment rate for physicians is generally very low and quite stable, con-
sistent with unemployment spells being primarily frictional and acyclic. For exam-
ple, between May 2006 and May 2009 the national average unemployment rate rose
from about 4.6% to 9.4%, while the unemployment rate for physicians and surgeons re-
mained between 1.5% and 1.6% (Sources: http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes291069.htm and
http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2009/jun/wk2/art02.htm).
75
that a worker move out of the market, it is generally more costly to move after sign-
ing an NCA. Assume that for a worker who has accepted a non-compete agreement,
the cost of switching jobs is L > 0, while for a worker without an NCA the cost of
switching jobs is zero. The Bellman equation for a worker who has an NCA, and
who receives wage omega is:
V(!; 1) = ! + 
h

R 1
0 maxfV(!0; 1)   V(!; 1)   L; 0gdF(!0) + (1   )
R 1
0 maxfV(!0; 0)   V(!; 1)   L; 0gdF(!0)
i
where  2 (0; 1) is the period discount factor and F(!) is the distribution of wage
offers. Similarly, for a worker without an NCA, the Bellman equation is:
V(!; 0) = ! + 
h

R 1
0 maxfV(!0; 1)   V(!; 0); 0gdF(!0) + (1   )
R 1
0 maxfV(!0; 0)   V(!; 0); 0gdF(!0)
i
Define !R such that V(!; 0)  V(!R; 1), so !R is the reservation wage for a job
with an NCA. Denote by ¯1 and ¯0 the expected duration of a job spell with an NCA
and without, respectively. Then L˜1  L=¯1 is the expected flow cost associated with
accepting an NCA.
V(!; 0)  V(!R; 1)
) ! + 
266664Z 1
!R
V(!0; 1)   V(!; 0)dF(!0) + (1   )
Z 1
!
V(!0; 0)   V(!; 0)dF(!0)
377775
= !R + 
""

Z 1
!R+L˜1
V(!0; 1)   V(!R; 1)dF(!0)
#
+ (1   )
"Z 1
!R+L˜0
V(!0; 0)   V(!R; 1)dF(!0)
##
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TheCompensatingWageDifferential for Non-Compete Agreements
) !   !R

= 
"Z 1
!R+L˜1
V(!0; 1)   V(!R; 1)dF(!0)  
Z 1
!R
V(!0; 1)   V(!; 0)dF(!0)
#
+(1   )
"Z 1
!R+L˜0
V(!0; 0)   V(!R; 1)dF(!0)  
Z 1
!
V(!0; 0)   V(!; 0)dF(!0)
#
) !R = !+
2666666666666666664
Z !R+L˜1
!R
V(!0; 1)   V(!; 0)dF(!0)|                                     {z                                     }
> 0
+(1   )
Z !R+L˜0
!
V(!0; 0)   V(!; 0)dF(!0)|                                     {z                                     }
> 0
3777777777777777775
The compensating differential for accepting an NCA is !R  !, which is strictly pos-
itive whenever L > 0.
(Partial) EquilibriumUse ofNon-Compete Agreements
For much of the following, it is simpler to present the discussion in terms of the
static decision problem faced in each period of the dynamic model presented above.
Relaxing the assumption that the arrival rate of job offers is independent of non-
compete status, suppose there are two different arrival rates for job offers: l is the
arrival rate for offers from other firms in the worker’s local labor market, and o is
the arrival rate for offers in other labor markets. Workers with non-compete agree-
ments are forbidden from searching in the local labor market, so they receive offers
at the rate o, while workers without non-compete agreements receive offers at the
rate (l + o). Assume for simplicity that the proportion of job vacancies with non-
compete agreements, , is the same in each market. We will address this assumption
later, but this simple model demonstrates the relevant point at hand. To generalize
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further, suppose that wages are drawn from different arbitrary distributions, F1 for
jobs with non-compete agreements and F0 for jobs without.
Workers transition into jobs with non-compete agreements at the rate (l +
o)(1   F1(!R)), and out of jobs with non-compete agreements at the rate o(1  
)(1   F0(!R + L˜0)). The derivative of the proportion of workers with non-compete
agreements is:
˙ = (l + o)(1   F1(!R))   o(1   )(1   F0(!R + L˜0))
which implies that in steady state:
? =
o(1   F0(!R + L˜0))
(l + o)(1   F1(!R)) + o(1   F0(!R + L˜0))
The implication of this is that as long as F0(!R+ L˜0) < 1, the steady-state will involve
a strictly positive fraction of workers with non-compete agreements, even if wages
for all jobs are drawn from the same distribution F.
One can also express the distribution of wages that would be observed in a cross-
sectional sample of workers, G(!). The flow of workers into jobs with non-compete
agreements at a wage no greater than ! is (l + o)(F1(!)   F1(!R)), while the flow
of workers out of jobs with non-compete agreements is o(1 )G(!)(1 F0(!R+ L˜0)).
At the steady state:
G(!) =
(l + o)(F1(!)   F1(!R))
o(1   )(1   F0(!R + L˜0))
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And from the steady-state ˙ = 0 condition:
G?(!) =
F1(!)   F1(!R)
1   F1(!R)
The Effect of Non-Compete Agreements onMobility
Using G? one can express the rate of job-to-job transition for a worker with a given
wage !. The total hazard rate for exiting a job without a non-compete agreement is:
0 = (l + o)
"
(1   )
Z 1
!
[1   F0(!)] dG?(!) + ()
Z 1
!R
[1   F1(!)] dG?(!)
#
and with a non-compete agreement the hazard rate is:
1 = (o)
"
(1   )
Z 1
!R+L˜0
[1   F0(!)] dG?(!) + ()
Z 1
!R+L˜1
[1   F1(!)] dG?(!)
#
0   1 = l(1   )
Z 1
!
[1   F0(!)] dG?(!)|                                      {z                                      }
> 0
+o(1   )
Z !R+L˜0
!
[1   F0(!)] dG?(!)|                                           {z                                           }
> 0
+l
Z 1
!R
[1   F1(!)] dG?(!)|                              {z                              }
> 0
+o
Z !R+L˜1
!R
[1   F1(!)] dG?(!)|                                   {z                                   }
> 0
The survivor function for jobs with non-compete agreements, as a function of!, first
order stochastically dominates the survivor function for jobs without non-competes,
implying that non-compete clauses lengthen job-spells and reduce the frequency of
job transitions. This holds true even if F0 = F1.
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It is also possible to decompose this difference in hazard rate into the component
due to the difference in offer arrival rates and the component due to the fixed cost
of job transitions due to non-compete agreements:
0   1 =
Component due to difference in offer arrival rates, > 0z                                                                                                                                    }|                                                                                                                                    {
l(1   )
Z 1
!
[1   F0(!)] dG?(!) + o(1   )
Z !R
!
[1   F0(!)] dG?(!) + l
Z 1
!R
[1   F1(!)] dG?(!)
+o
2666664(1   )Z !R+L˜0
!R
[1   F0(!)] dG?(!) + 
Z !R+L˜1
!R
[1   F1(!)] dG?(!)
3777775|                                                                                       {z                                                                                       }
Component due to L transition cost, > 0
There are two channels through which non-compete agreements can reduce mo-
bility. The first component occurs if the offer arrival rate is lower for workers who
have signed non-compete agreements, even if job transition costs do not depend
on non-compete agreements. The second component shows that increased transi-
tion costs associated with non-compete agreements reduce mobility, even if they
have no effect on offer arrival rates. Since both components are strictly positive,
E(1) > E(0) and E(L˜1) < E(L˜0) whenever L > 0. This model assumes that wages
remain fixed over time. As we discuss below, if non-compete agreements affect the
rate of change of wages over time, the tenure effect could have one or more crossing
points.
Labor Demand with Non-Compete Agreements
Since workers require higher wages to accept jobs with non-compete restrictions,
in equilibrium such agreements can only exist if firms are willing to pay higher
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wages. There are several potential explanations that are consistent with firms pay-
ing higher wages to impose non-compete agreements upon workers. One is that
search is costly, and non-compete agreements increase the expected duration of job-
spells, decreasing the average search costs to a firm of keeping a position filled. An-
other explanation is that increasing the expected duration of the job spell increases
the productivity of the worker. This could occur if physicians who expect to remain
at a practice for a longer time are more likely to form personal relationships with
their patients that increase their productivity, a form of learning by doing. Another
way in which firms benefit from non-compete agreements is that, for highly special-
ized workers like physicians, non-compete agreements give firms local monopsony
power. Since most labor contracts are not long-term, monopsonistic power affects
negotiations subsequent to the non-compete agreement. It could affect, for exam-
ple, the dynamic wage profiles of workers who are bound to them. This increase in
future bargaining power is valuable to firms, and is another reason why they may
be willing to pay higher wages.
There are also potential secondary effects that could cause wages to differ de-
pending on whether a worker has a non-compete agreement. For example, differ-
ences in either the rates or returns to learning by doing could affect the elasticity
of labor supply. Hansen and Imrohoroglu (2009), for example, show that when the
impact of learning by doing is greater, labor supply is more elastic. Since physicians
often have some flexibility over their choice of hours, a change in the elasticity of
labor supply could affect both the number of hours worked and wage. Thus non-
compete agreements have the potential to affect both the intensive and extensive
margins of labor supply.
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Given these incentives, an important question is: why do we observe the use of
non-compete agreements for physicians, but less frequently in many other profes-
sions? One difference between primary care physicians and many other professions
is that physicians generate substantial intangible value over time as patients become
loyal them. In many cases this loyalty is to an individual physician, rather than to a
practice. Without a non-compete clause, a physician has the power to substantially
affect the value of the firm by taking patients away from it. Non-compete clauses
are one way in which firms can insure against such changes to the intangible assets
of the firm.
To further investigate firms’ incentives and bargaining, consider the following
model of firm behavior: There are two types of jobs, those with non-competes and
those without. The cost to the firm of operating a job with a non-compete clause, k1,
is at least as high as that of operating a job without, k0. For simplicity, assume that
firms pay this cost of operating a job regardless of whether the position is vacant or
filled. Output produced in a job with a non-compete is a andwithout a non-compete
output is ay, where 0 < y  1 Net output satisfies a   k1  ay   k0, which implies that
y  1   (k1   k0). For a firm that uses non-compete agreements, the expected profit
from recruiting a worker is:
J1(!1) =
a   k1   !1   o
h
(1   F1(!1 + L˜1)) + (1   )(1   F0(!1 + L˜0))
i
1   
J0(!0) =
ay   k0   !0   (l + o)
h
(1   F1(!0 + L˜1)) + (1   )(1   F0(!0)
i
1   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Firms offer contracts with non-compete agreements if J1  J0, or
Productivity Gainz   }|   {
a(1   y) +
Increase in Expected Profit from Lower Probability of Job Switchz                                                                                                          }|                                                                                                          {
l
h
F0(!0)   F1(!1 + L˜1)
i
+ 0(1   )
h
F0(!0)   F0(!0 + L˜0)
i
+ l [1   F0(!0)]
> (!1   !0) + (k1   k0)|                     {z                     }
Wage and Cost Increases
Bargaining and Wage Determination
The determination of wages follows from Pissarides (1994), where the surplus from
a worker and firm match is split according to the relative bargaining power of each.
This approach is more appealing than the approaches used in other partial models
of on-the-job search, 11 because these models ignore the effect of search on local
monopsony power, which invalidates the assumption that wages equal the value
of marginal product. The effect of non-compete agreements on local monopsony
power is precisely what we are interested in investigating.
For a worker who is not constrained by a non-compete agreement, whose ex-
pected return to current employment is V0, the equilibrium wage for a job without a
non-compete agreement is given by:
!00 = V0 + 

ay   k0   V0   (1   )(o + l) h(V 01   V0) + (1   )(V 00   V0)i
where  is the fraction of the net surplus created by the job that goes to the worker.
11Including Burdett (1978), Mortensen (1986), Jovanovic (1984), and Burgess (1991)
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Similarly, for a worker who switches into a job with a non-compete agreement:
!01 = V0 +  [a   k1   V0]   (1   )o
h
(V
0
1   V1   L) + (1   )(V
0
0   V1   L)
i
In this model, for workers with non-compete agreements there are two distinct ef-
fects that tend to increase wages. The first is the increase in productivity, a(1   y),
due to increased learning on the job. The second is due to the reduction in search
intensity by the factor l, which reduces the absolute value of the negative term.
Dynamic Effects
To be explicit about the dynamic effects, denote by a() and !() productivity and
wages as functions of job tenure. Assume that a() is continuous, weakly increasing,
and differentiable, with a finite upper bound. Subsequent to the initial wage bar-
gaining problem, firms that have negotiated non-compete agreements with work-
ers have greater local monopsony power, which reduces the magnitude of  for all
bargaining that takes place after the initial agreement. Denote by ¯ and  the initial
and subsequent bargaining power of workers who accept non-compete agreements.
Suppose that wages do not fall, but that bargaining takes place over the magnitude
of wage increases. Intuitively, !01() is determined by two components. The first
is proportional to the change in productivity, !01(0) + (a()   a(0)) and is clearly
positive. The second component is slightly more complicated. The reduction in bar-
gaining power for the worker tends to reduce wages by increasing the firm’s share
of the expected gains from on-the-job search. Simultaneously, as wages rise with
tenure at the firm, the probability that a wage offer will dominate the current wage
falls, reducing the expected gains to search. The change in bargaining power af-
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fects the level of wages, while the expected gains from search depends on the rate
of change of wages.
The more interesting question is: are wages at tenure  affected by non-compete
agreements. Again, there are two distinct components: one due to bargaining over
productivity gains, and another due to bargaining over changes in the expected
gains from on-the-job search. The effect of productivity gains on wages is
!01(0)   !00(0) + a()
h
   ¯y
i
From the static analysis, we expect that !01(0)   !00(0) > 0. The second term has
ambiguous direction, and there are two possible scenarios. If the reduction in bar-
gaining power is very large then  will be small relative to ¯y, and the wage profile
will tend to flatter for workers with non-compete agreements. That is, the initial
compensating differential for accepting a non-compete agreement will gradually
dissipate, and the difference in wages could become negative as  increases. Since
firms are still constrained by workers’ opportunities outside the local market, it
would require fairly extreme and implausible assumptions for  to fall to zero if
¯ > 0. Conversely, if the effect of non-compete agreements on productivity through
learning by doing is large relative to the change in bargaining power, then y is rela-
tively small and    ¯y > 0. In this scenario the dynamic wage profiles for workers
with non-compete agreements could both start above those of workers without non-
competes, and rise at a faster rate. The second component, due to changes in the
expected gains from on-the-job search, tends to increase wages as  increases and
the expected gains to switching decrease. The difference in the rate at which wages
increase depends on the sign of the first component, and so this second component
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tends in the same direction as the first component in each of the cases. Thus the total
net effect on the dynamic wage path depends on the effect that non-compete agree-
ments have on learning-by-doing relative to their effects on bargaining through an
increase in monopsony power by firms.
Although the magnitude of each effect is not separately identifiable with our
data, this model suggests a testable empirical hypothesis with direct policy rel-
evance. If the wage profile of workers with non-compete agreements is steeper
than those without, the data suggest that the productivity gains through increased
learning-by-doing, or some similar channel, outweigh the effects of local monop-
sony power by firms. A related testable hypothesis is that if local monopsony power
by firms has a relatively small effect on the dynamic wage profile, then the rate of
job-to-job switching should fall faster with tenure for workers with non-compete
clauses than for those without. The static analysis suggested that the level of job-to-
job switching should be lower for workers with non-compete agreements as well.
Of course, it is intuitively likely that there is a crossing point ? after which job-to-
job switches no longer have any gain, so the hypothesis is relevant to the lower end
of the support of the distribution of job tenure.
2.4 Data and Estimation Approach
2.4.1 Data
This research draws on data from the Physician Perspectives on Managed Care Sur-
vey, conducted in 2007 and funded by the Agency for Healthcare Research and
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Quality (AHRQ), the California Endowment, and the Commonwealth Fund. The
study sampled physicians who were listed in the American Medical Association
(AMA) Masterfile as providing patient care in the specialties of general family prac-
tice, general practice, general internal medicine, and general pediatrics in five states,
California, Texas, Illinois, Georgia, and Pennsylvania, whichwere selected to be rep-
resentative of a variety of practice environments. Using a state-based sample rather
than a national survey permitted collection of larger samples for local market areas.
Excluded from the target population were residents, fellows, physicians not in clin-
ical practice, and those over 70 years of age. Pediatricians and minority physicians
were over-sampled.12
The AMA database provides information on physician location and contact in-
formation, specialty and training, age, and, where information was available, race.
Telephone calls verified contact information and whether sample physicians were
providing patient care. A multi-mode (mail and web) self-administered survey was
conducted. A packet was sent by Federal Express to a total of 2,831 physicians con-
taining a mail survey accompanied by an advance letter, a pre-paid business return
envelope and an honorarium check of $100. Physicians were given the option of
responding by web. Follow-up was conducted for those physicians who did not
respond, with separate follow-up with those who did not respond but cashed their
checks. Altogether, a total of 1,967 usable responses were received, 216 (11%) of
which were by web. The overall response rate was 69.8%. Responses varied by sam-
pled specialty from 76% for pediatricians to 64% for specialists in internal medicine.
Base sampling weights were assigned to each physician based on the inverse of
12While pediatricians made up approximately 23in the study states, they were oversampled so
that they made up 45oversampled to ensure a sample of at least 200 responses in order to provide a
meaningful basis for analyses examining this subgroup.
87
their probability of selection and then adjusted for the probability of non-response
and the probability of being sampled based on race.
The survey questionnaire included questions on the following topics: physician
characteristics, practice characteristics, physician demographics, practice revenues,
physician income, administrative controls, practice use of electronic medical records
and HIT, and patient vignettes.
Physicians were asked how many medical practices they worked in and their
ownership status in their main practice. If they responded they were a sole-owner,
the survey proceeded to questions about general practice characteristics. However,
if the physician indicated that they were not a sole-owner, they were asked about
their employment status and the following question regarding non-competes:
Were you to leave your (main) practice, would you be subject to a non-compete
clause?
 Yes
 No
Physicians were also asked the year inwhich they beganwork in their main practice,
from which we have information about practice tenure.
2.4.2 Estimation Approach
In order to estimate the compensatingwage differential for accepting a non-compete
agreement, it would be ideal to have longitudinal data with job-switches, which
would allow one to control for unobserved heterogeneity across physicians. An im-
portant source of unobserved heterogeneity is the physician’s latent preference for
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workplace mobility, which is likely to characterize sorting behavior between firms
that impose non-compete agreements and workers. Failure to control for the un-
observed factors that affect this assortative matching implies that our estimates are
measures of the average slope of the equilibrium envelope function with respect
to wages and the strength of non-compete restrictions. As are almost all estimates
of compensating differentials, this is an estimate of the average effect of treatment
on the treated. Although the data cannot identify workers’ preferences for non-
compete agreements, they are nonetheless informative about the market equilib-
rium. We are particularly interested in the market equilibrium here, rather than in
preferences, because of the concern about potential anticompetitive effects of non-
compete agreements. Thus the data limitations are less problematic here than in
many other cross-sectional estimates of compensating wage differentials.
Our estimates of the wage effects are limited to the selected sample of workers
who chose to accept non-compete agreements. The equilibriumwage price of a non-
compete restriction is based on the preferences of the marginal worker in a market,
and so the wage effects would likely change if a policy change altered the expected
benefits to firms of imposing non-competes. Our estimates of the wage effects can
be interpreted as a lower bound on workers’ preferences for accepting non-compete
restrictions, as those workers with stronger preferences against non-competes are
less likely to have accepted them.
In examining adoption of non-compete agreements, we focus on individual
physicians as we lack complete practice-level data. We first estimate a model of the
use of non-compete agreements, in which the dependent variable is whether or not
the worker is bound by a non-compete agreement, and independent variables in-
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clude observable physician characteristics such as age, specialty, whether the physi-
cian plans to retire within 3 years, a control for US or foreign medical training, race,
and ownership status. To a limited extent we control for preferences for mobility
by including a variable that equals one if the physician has an employed spouse
or partner, which may affect the cost of geographic mobility.13 We also control for
practice and local market conditions, including whether the practice is office-based,
free-standing, or associated with a University; whether it is a small practice with 3
or fewer physicians; whether there are physicians with different specialties at the
practice; the percent of the practice’s patients that are insured; the log of physicians
per capita in the local market; and the log of household income in the market. We
control for the state in which the practice is located, to account for differences across
states in the strength of non-compete enforcement, and an interaction between state
and ownership status. The interaction terms capture possible state-level differences
in the treatment of part-owners versus employees. Our state dummies may cap-
ture not only differences in the ability to enforce non-competes, but also other un-
observed state characteristics not already controlled-for by market characteristics.
An alternative specification uses the measure of non-compete restrictiveness from
Bishara (2011). Using state dummies alone avoids possible biases that could be asso-
ciated with incorrectly assessing differences in legal treatment, but cannot identify
the answer to a key question of interest: what effects would a change in the restric-
tiveness of non-compete agreements have on the labor market?
We expect that the benefit to a practice of imposing a non-compete agreement
13We also tried controlling for geographic differences in mobility preferences using census data to
estimate the probability that a person in a given zip code will move to another zip code more than
100 miles away in a given year. This variable had little explanatory power and was dropped from
the analysis.
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depends upon whether the physician is a part-owner or simply an employee of the
practice. If a part-owner were to leave a practice and compete against it, they may
also reduce the value of their equity share in the practice. This incentive to maintain
the value of their stake in the practice in the absence of a non-compete agreement
increases the marginal cost to the physician of competing against the practice, and
thus decreases the marginal benefit to the practice of imposing a non-compete. As a
consequence, we hypothesize a practice will bemore likely to require a non-compete
for employee physicians.
We identify the effect of non-compete agreements on equilibrium wages using
cross-sectional variation in hourly earnings and observable characteristics, includ-
ing similar physician, practice, and market conditions. Hourly earnings are calcu-
lated as total annual earnings divided by the average number of hours spent work-
ing each week times 50. Hours worked includes time spent treating patients as well
as other administrative work. To capture differences in costs of living, we use the
Medicare geographic practice expense index.14 We estimate the model separately
for the employees and part-owners, as well as for the combined sample.
We also estimate how the equilibrium compensating differential for accepting
a non-compete agreement changes with tenure at the practice. This model is used
to test the hypothesis from the theoretical model that non-compete agreements af-
fect the dynamic wage profiles of workers, and to provide evidence on whether the
predominant channel through which they affect wage profiles is through changes
in monopsonistic bargaining power or by affecting productivity, possibly through
14An alternative would be use CPI data. However, these data are only available for a limited
number of MSAs and on a regional basis, whereas Medicare geographic practice expense index is
available at the local level nationwide. Comparing this index with the CPI, the two indexes generally
track closely.
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learning by doing.
To investigate the relationship between NCAs and physician mobility, we use
responses to the question: What year did you begin working in this practice? This
variable is of course a right-censored measure of tenure for every respondent in
the sample, and we never observe the true length of a job-spell in the survey. Still,
we can use the responses to this question, along with potential experience, to infer
whether a physician has switched practices at least one time in his or her career.
We then estimate patterns between the use of NCAs and this mobility variable for
physicians with various levels of potential experience.
To account for differences in the enforceability of NCAs in different states, we
use a continuous measure for NCAs rather than a dummy variable. The variable is
constructed for each state by dividing the score from Bishara (2011) by the highest
score for any state, so that the variable ranges between zero and one. A one unit
increase in this variable has the convenient interpretation as the difference between
the most restrictive and least restrictive laws in place.
2.5 Results
Table 2.3 reports the share of physicians with non-compete agreements in each state
in the sample. The use of non-compete agreements varies substantially across states,
ranging from 31.3% in California to 60.6% in Pennsylvania, with an average of 45.1%
of all physicians in the sample subject to non-compete agreements. This variation
in usage is consistent with differences in enforceability causing differences across
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states in the benefits of imposing non-compete agreements. We present further ev-
idence of this in Table 2.9. Across the five states in our sample, the correlation be-
tween the fraction of physicians with non-competes and the overall strength of state
enforceability is highly positive, 0.93. Non-competes are also used more frequently
for physicians who are employees (49.2%) rather than part-owners (43.1%). This
is consistent with the hypothesis that part-owners have some deterrent to compet-
ing against their current practice because doing so could devalue their share of the
practice’s equity. Thus the net benefit to a firm of imposing a non-compete on a
part-owner may be lower.
Table 2.3: % of Respondents with Non-Compete Clauses, By State and Employment
Status
Full Sample Employees Part Owners
California 511 31.3% 225 29.8% 206 36.9%
Georgia 120 51.7% 51 60.8% 53 43.4%
Illinois 217 52.1% 124 50.0% 73 54.8%
Pennsylvania 231 60.6% 147 66.0% 62 54.8%
Texas 268 49.6% 129 58.9% 97 45.4%
All States 1347 45.1% 723 49.2% 534 43.1%
The use of non-compete agreements has also been increasing rapidly over time.
The last column of Table 2.4 shows that for physicians who graduated medical
school within 5 years of the survey, about 61% are subject to non-compete agree-
ments. Of the physicians who graduated during the 1990’s, approximately 48% are
subject to non-competes, and only 43% of physicians who graduated before 1990.
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Table 2.4: % of Respondents with Non-Compete Clauses, By Potential Experience
and Practice Tenure
Tenure
Potential Exp. 5 of Fewer 6 to 10 11 to 15 16 to 20 More than 20
Less than 5 61.0% 61.0%
6 to 10 44.0% 50.0% 47.2%
11 to 15 47.6% 42.7% 56.8% 48.2%
16 to 20 39.3% 40.4% 41.7% 51.6% 43.4%
More than 20 38.8% 46.7% 41.8% 37.5% 43.7% 42.3%
44.6% 46.1% 47.0% 43.2% 43.7% 45.1%
This change over time is largely due to shifts in the characteristics of practices.
Table 2.5 shows the effects that physician, practice, and market characteristics have
on the probability that a physician is subject to a non-compete agreement using a
logit regressionwhere the dependent variable is 1 if the physician is subject to a non-
compete. Physicians in office-based practices are about 13 percentage points more
likely to have a non-compete relative to hospital-based and community care physi-
cians. Physicians in free-standing practices or university practices are significantly
less likely to have non-compete agreements, about 27 and 23 percentage points, re-
spectively. Small practices, with fewer than four physicians are significantly less
likely to impose non-compete agreements as well, by about 12 percentage points.
The effect of ownership status on the use of non-compete was clearly negative in
the summary statistics in Table 2.3, and marginal effect from the logit regression
is an 11 percentage point reduction for part-owners. The most substantial effects
are for physicians who indicate that they are nearing retirement, who are about 28
percentage points less likely to have a non-compete. An indication of preferences
for mobility, physicians with employed spouses were about 9 percentage points less
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likely to have accepted a job with a non-compete agreement. Physicians in Pennsyl-
vania were significantly more likely to be subject to non-compete agreements than
those in Georgia. Model 3 shows that the strength of enforceability of non-competes
in the state has a large and significant effect on the usage of non-competes. The
variable ‘State Restrictiveness Score (Bishara)’ scales the state ratings from Bishara
(2011) so that the values range between 0 and 1, with the most restrictive state hav-
ing a value of 1. We find that physicians in the state with the least enforceable
non-compete laws are about 24 percentage points less likely to have a non-compete
than those in the state with the most restrictive laws.
Perhaps the most important result in Table 2.5 from a policy perspective is the
significant effect that the relative supply of physicians per capita has on the usage
of non-compete agreements. A one log point increase the number of physicians per
100,000 residents reduces the probability that a physician will have a non-compete
agreement by about 25 percentage points. Since physician supply per capita is
highly correlated with total population, this result is consistent with firms in urban
areas being less concerned about the effects of a physician exiting the practice and
competing against it. The result suggests that physicians in rural areas are more
likely to be constrained by non-compete agreements. If selection on the basis of
preferences for occupational mobility affects rural and urban areas differently, state
enforcement of non-compete agreements may have implications for the disparities
that exist in the relative supply of physicians in urban and rural areas.
Estimates of the static compensating wage differential for accepting a non-
compete agreement are presented in Table 2.6. In Model 4 we find that non-compete
agreements increase hourly earnings by about 11% on average. In Model 5 we con-
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trol for the restrictiveness of state laws, rather than using a dummy variable for
NCAs, and find that wages for workers with non-competes in the most restrictive
state are about 17% higher than wages for workers without non-compete agree-
ments. Both of these estimates are significant at the 1% level. Models 5 and 6 sep-
arately estimate the effect for employees and part-owners. We find that the com-
pensating differential for employees is about a 20% increase in hourly earnings,
and there is no statistically significant compensating differential for part-owners,
although the coefficient is positive.
Coefficients on other covariates are largely consistent with theory. The preferred
model is (5), in which we find that hourly earnings are about 8 percent higher for
pediatricians, about 22 percent higher for very senior physicians who are nearing
retirement, and about 14 percent higher for physicians associated with universities.
Wages are also about 9 percent higher for part-owners, and 19 percent lower for
independent contractors. Our findings are consistent with data from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics, which suggest that self-employed practice owners earn higher
median incomes than employed physicians. We also find that the elasticity of wages
with respect to the supply of physicians per capita in the state in -0.19. We also
control for geographic variation in prices with an index of physician practice costs.
Table 2.7 presents estimates of the dynamic effects that NCAs have on the career
wage paths of physicians. The theoretical model suggested a testable hypothesis
about the relative size of productivity gains and monopsonistic effects based on
the difference between the slope of the wage profiles of workers with and without
NCAs. To the extent that the net effect is significantly different from zero, this would
suggest that one of these two predicted effects has substantially more influence on
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the dynamic wage path than the other. We find that NCAs have a nonlinear effect on
thewage path, which causes it to be steeper initially and then fall significantly below
the wage path for workers without NCAs. The predicted wage path as a function
of potential experience for physicians without NCAs is shown in Figure 2.1 and for
physicians with NCAs in Figure 2.2. A comparison of the wage paths in Figure 2.3
shows that wages for physicians with NCAs are not statistically significantly differ-
ent at very low levels of potential experience, but the rate of increase is significantly
higher for physicians with NCAs until they have around 15 years of experience. By
that time the hourly earnings of physicians with NCAs are about 11% higher than
those without. However, after about 20 years of potential experience the hourly
earnings of physicians with NCAs actually fall, erasing the wage gap. This suggests
that both hypothesized effects may play some role. The steeper increase in wages
with initial experience is consistent with the hypothesis that NCAs increase the rate
of learning by doing. However, by mid-career, the effects of monopsony power ap-
pear to outweigh the incremental productivity effects, and the wage premium is
erased.
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Table 2.7: Dynamic Hourly Earnings Models
Dependent Variable: Log Hourly Earnings (8)
Coeff. S.E.
Non-Compete Clause -0.11 0.11
Non-Compete ClausePotential Experience 0.0303 0.0135 **
Non-Compete ClausePotential Experience Sq. -0.0009 0.0004 **
Specialist: Internal Medicine 0.01 0.06
Specialist: Pediatrics 0.09 0.04 **
Specialist: Secondary Specialty 0.06 0.05
Plan to Retire within 3 Years 0.19 0.15
Office-based practice -0.04 0.05
Free Standing practice 0.09 0.13
University practice 0.12 0.11
Years of Tenure at Current Practice 0.01 0.00 **
Small Practice (1-3) -0.01 0.04
Potential Experience 0.00 0.00
Multi-Specialty Practice -0.07 0.04 *
Part Owner of Practice 0.28 0.08 ***
Independent Contractor at Practice 0.16 0.08 **
Employed Spouse/Partner 0.00 0.04
US Med School -0.01 0.06
Percent Urban 0.00 0.00
White, Non-Hispanic 0.00 0.06
Asian 0.03 0.06
Black -0.02 0.11
Geo. Phys. Cost Index - Practice Exp. -0.03 0.01 **
Geo. Phys. Cost Index - Practice Exp. Squared 0.00 0.00 **
ln(Primary Care Physicians per 100,000 Residents ) -0.24 0.08 ***
ln(Median Household Income) -0.06 0.05
State: PA -0.03 0.08
State: CA 0.10 0.08
State: TX 0.13 0.08 *
State: IL 0.07 0.08
Constant 7.06 0.84 ***
N 650
Adj. R2 0.130
Note: All standard errors are White-Huber heteroskedasticity-adjusted. Sample in-
cludes physicians who reported between 200 and 4000 annual hours worked and
are less than 65 years old. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at
1%.
From a policy perspective, one concern is that the cost of compensating differ-
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entials are being passed onto consumers in the form of higher prices, as economic
theory suggests that it may if firms have bargaining power in the output market. We
test for this explicitly using data on the price of an initial patient visit. The survey in-
cluded the question: “on average, what is your net fee after discount for an initial of-
fice visit with a private commercially-insured patient?” Table 2.8 presents estimates
of the effect of state enforceability of non-competes on the price of initial office visits.
In Models 9 and 10 the dependent variable is the log of the initial visit price divided
by the geographic physician practice cost index. In Model 11 the dependent vari-
able is the log of the initial visit price, and the practice cost index is included as an
explanatory variable instead. We also control for all other observable characteristics
in our data that one would expect to affect prices, including the supply of physi-
cians per capita in the zip code, median household income in the practice zip code,
physician specialty, practice setting practice size, and managed care concentration.
We find that increasing the state restrictiveness score of non-compete enforcement
by one unit, which is equivalent to the difference in enforceability between the least
enforceable state in the country (North Dakota) to the most enforceable state in the
country (Florida) increases the cost-adjusted price of initial patient visit by about
36%. In Model 11, without cost-adjustment in the dependent variable, the effect is a
25% increase in price. One concern with these models is that all of the variation is at
the state level, so if there are characteristics of the state that are not controlled-for in
the model, the estimates could be biased. In Model 10 we use state effects instead of
controlling for the restrictiveness of non-compete agreements. A comparison of the
state effects to the state restrictiveness scores suggests that the cross-state variation
is indeed consistent with the enforceability of NCAs. In California, the least enforce-
able state, prices are about 24% lower, controlling for factors that affect supply and
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demand. The three states in our sample with the most enforceable non-compete
laws are PA, TX, IL. We strongly reject the hypothesis that prices in California as
high as they are in any of these states. The second least restrictive state, Georgia, is
omitted, and the positive coefficients on the other included states is consistent with
our hypothesis, although the small sample size of 350 is insufficient for cross-state
comparison between the states with similar restrictiveness scores. This suggests that
any omitted state factors either have little effect on prices charged by physicians or
are strongly correlated with state laws regarding NCAs.
Figure 2.1: Predicted Wage vs. Potential Experience, Without NCA
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Note: Predicted Wage from Table 2.7. Line is best-fitting
quadratic function, with 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 2.2: Predicted Wage vs. Potential Experience, With NCA
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Note: Predicted Wage from Table 2.7. Line is best-fitting
quadratic function, with 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 2.3: Comparison of Predicted Wage Paths, With and Without NCAs
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Note: Predicted Wage from Table 2.7. Lines are best-fitting
quadratic functions, with 95% confidence intervals.
The models in Table 2.9 suggest that physicians assortatively match with prac-
tices based on preferences for occupational mobility. We find that physicians who
are not subject to NCAs are about 15 percentage points more likely to have switched
practices within the last ten years for every 1 unit increase in the Bishara scale. Since
the percentage of physicians subject toNCAs is higher in restrictive states, the physi-
cians who are not constrained by NCAs are those with the strongest preferences for
mobility.
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Table 2.9: Logit Models of Sorting into NCAs
(12) (13)
Without NCA With NCA
Dependent Variable Moved 10 Years Moved 10 Years
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Bishara Score 0.15 0.08 * -0.09 0.09
Specialist: Internal Medicine 0.13 0.07 * 0.05 0.07
Specialist: Pediatrics 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.06
Specialist: Secondary Specialty 0.02 0.07 0.09 0.08
Office-based practice -0.12 0.07 * -0.22 0.09 **
Free-Standing practice 0.26 0.21 -0.02 0.25
University practice -0.18 0.08 ** -0.14 0.1
Small Practice (1-3) 0.17 0.06 ** 0.11 0.07 *
Multi-Specialty Practice -0.02 0.05 0.12 0.05 **
Part Owner -0.25 0.05 *** -0.13 0.05 **
% Managed Care 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
Employed Spouse/Partner -0.02 0.06 0.04 0.05
US Med School -0.28 0.07 *** -0.26 0.09 ***
Age 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.06
Age Sq. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
Percent Urban 0.00 0.00 * 0.00 0 **
Hispanic -0.03 0.09 0.04 0.1
Asian -0.05 0.07 0.01 0.08
Black -0.10 0.10 0.25 0.1 **
Log Physicians per 100,000 Residents -0.03 0.10 -0.22 0.1 **
Log Median Household Income -0.07 0.07 0.11 0.06 *
N 445 393
Adj R2 0.14 0.13
Note: Marginal effects reported. All models include workers with 25 or fewer years
of potential experience. The dependent variable is 1 if the physicianmoved practices
within the last 10 years, and 0 otherwise. White-Huber heteroskedasticity-adjusted
standard errors reported. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at
1%.
In Table 2.10 we use aggregate data on the number of physicians per capita from
all 50 states to estimate whether the restrictiveness of NCAs has an effect on the ge-
ographic distribution of physicians. We find some evidence that this is the case for
the 10 states with the most restrictive NCA laws, but that there appears to be no sta-
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tistically significant effect on aggregate supply outside of those states. Specifically,
we find that the number of general physicians per capita is about seven percent
lower for states in the highest quintile of Bishara scores. We control for income and
sources of insurance that affect demand for physician services, including the per-
centage of residents living below the poverty line, the percent above 65 years old
who are eligible for Medicare, and the percent of residents with employer-provided
health insurance. We find that the mean effect is about the same for urban and
rural areas, although the standard errors increase when we change the dependent
variable to be physicians per capita in urban and rural areas in Models 16 and 17,
respectively, and the coefficients in these models are not statistically significant at
the 5% level. An F-test that the per capita supply of physicians is the same in states
among the highest and lowest quintiles of the Bishara score is strongly rejected in
Model 15, 16, and 17, with p-values between 0.03 and 0.04.
Given the strong evidence of assortative matching within states and selection
into states based on NCAs, we cannot estimate the causal effect of NCAs on mobil-
ity because of the endogeneity caused by latent preferences for occupational mobil-
ity that give rise to the observed selection. However, we can estimate the combined
effects of selection into NCAs and any potential causal effect of NCAs on mobility.
This estimate is unbiased if the acceptance of an NCA in a given state is an effec-
tive proxy for latent preferences for mobility, so that the error term is uncorrelated
with included variables. The individual effects themselves are not identified, but
the combined effect may be useful for policymakers. Firms may benefit from using
NCAs either as a mechanism to select physicians based on unobserved preferences
or to causally affect mobility, both of which provide value to the firm and may con-
tribute to the justification of the legality of their use. Table 2.11 shows our estimates
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of the combined effects of selection and any potential causal effect of NCAs on mo-
bility. Model 20 shows that among physicians with fewer than 25 years of potential
experience, those who chose to accept NCAs were 19 percentage points less likely
to have switched practices within the past decade than physicians without NCAs.
Our theoretical model suggests that there may be a causal relationship, but the mag-
nitude of any such relationship, if it exists, is unidentified.
Whereas non-competes may be associated with differences in mobility that affect
the extensive margin of labor supply in local markets, there may also be an intensive
margin relationship. Table 2.12 presents estimates of the static elasticity of labor
supply for physicians with and without non-compete agreements. Note that we do
not have data on spouses’ earnings, so we can only control for spousal employment,
and we do not know about unearned income. In Model 23 we estimate the elasticity
of labor supply to be about -0.164 for physicians without non-competes, suggesting
that physicians make marginal decisions on the backward bending portion of the
labor supply curve. We find evidence that non-compete agreements are associated
with an increase in the absolute value of the elasticity of labor supply, to about -
0.265. Model 24 uses deciles of the physicians hourly earnings to instrument for
wages, which has been shown to reduce attenuation bias from measurement error
in wages.15 In the IV model we still find a statistically significant difference. When
we estimate similar models using the Bishara score rather than a dummy variable
for NCAs, we find no significant relationship between the strength of state laws
and the elasticity of labor supply. It is also notable in Models 23 and 24 that we
find a significant difference in the number of hours worked depending on whether
a physician has an NCA. Those with NCAs worked over 800 hours more annually
15See, for example, Blau and Kahn (2007)
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than physicians without NCAs, which is consistent with the claim that physicians
with NCAs invest more effort in building relationships with their patients.
2.6 Conclusion
There is large legal literature on non-compete agreements and they have been the
subject of considerable controversy, but there has been little systematic analysis on
their use or impact on labor markets. While our sample is limited to family practice
physicians and pediatricians in five states, this paper makes three important con-
tributions to the literature. First, it provides new concrete evidence of widespread
use of non-competes in physician groups in general practice and pediatrics that is
broadly consistent with claims about their growing use. Even in California, where
NCAs have little legal restriction, over 30% of physicians in our sample reported
being subject to an NCA.
Second, our analysis of the adoption of non-competes suggests they are being
used in ways consistent with economic theory, and that public policy has a role in
affecting outcomes. Use of non-competes is higher in office-based practices and for
employees. At the same time, the use of non-competes is consistent with differences
in state level policies. We find substantial evidence that physicians assortatively
match with practices based on the use of NCAs, and that states with extremely re-
strictive laws have a lower aggregate supply of general physicians per capita.
Third, we find evidence that non-competes substantially affect labor market out-
comes. Wages of physicians with non-compete agreements are about 11 percent
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higher than those without on average, and about 17 percent higher in states with
the most strict legal enforceability of non-competes. To our knowledge, these es-
timates provide the first empirical evidence on the wage effects of non-compete
agreements in any labor market. We also find that these higher wages are passed
on to consumers in the form of significantly higher prices for services in states with
more restrictive NCA laws. We estimate the relationship between the use of NCAs
and occupational mobility, although the causal effect is unidentified in our data.
We find that physicians with non-compete agreements in strict states were 19 per-
centage points less likely to have switched practices within the previous ten years
than those without non-competes. This estimate is the combined effect of assorta-
tive matching and any potential causal effect of NCAs on mobility. It suggests that,
regardless of whether there is a causal relationship, firms may benefit from the use
of NCAs by either facilitating the selection of physicians who plan to remain at the
practice or causally affecting labor mobility. Evidence on effects of NCAs on the
dynamic wage paths of physicians suggests that NCAs increase the monopsonistic
bargaining power of firms, which affects changes in wages over time, but this ef-
fect is offset in part by a steeper initial wage path, consistent with an increase in
investment in human capital accumulation by firms.
Taken together, these findings suggest that state policies regarding non-competes
play an important role in shaping the organization and operation of physician labor
markets. In particular, state-level legislation on non-compete agreements can affect
the overall supply of physicians per capita in a state as well as the number of hours
that physicians work, the intensive margin of labor supply.
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APPENDIX A
CHAPTER 1: IMPUTATION OF OUTSIDE OPTIONWAGE
The structural models that do no rely upon reported wages from non-fishing jobs as
the outside option use instead imputed wages from 2003-2009 CPS data. The wage
equation used to predict wages for the sample of workers is presented below. In all
of the results presented in the paper, the outside option is assumed to be full-time,
non-temporary employment. In addition to the variables shown below, the model
also includes state effects, year effects, quarter of year effects, and interation terms
between temporary worker and quarter of the year.
Summary statistics of the imputedwages are presented in Table A.2. The average
and median imputed wage was $12.26 per hour.
Table A.1: CPS Wage Imputation Model
Dependent Variable: Log(Hourly Wage)
Coeff. S.E.
Potential Experience 0.0339 *** [0.0004]
Potential Experience Sq. -0.0006 *** [0.0000]
MSA 0.0404 *** [0.0026]
Less than HS -0.3902 *** [0.0047]
HS Graduate -0.2063 *** [0.0041]
Some College -0.1396 *** [0.0041]
Black, NH -0.1582 *** [0.0039]
Asian -0.0999 *** [0.0079]
Hispanic -0.1368 *** [0.0033]
Other Race -0.0268 *** [0.0039]
Part-Time Worker -0.3560 *** [0.0041]
Near Full-Time Worker -0.2007 *** [0.0055]
Temporary Worker -0.1841 *** [0.0224]
Blue Collar Job 0.07916 *** [0.0024]
White Collar Job 0.2515 *** [0.0035]
N Obs. 205,231
R2 0.284
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Table A.2: Summary Statistics of Imputed Wages
Mean Hourly Wage 12.26
Minimum Hourly Wage 6.13
10th Percentile Hourly Wage 9.94
Median Hourly Wage 12.26
90th Percentile Hourly Wage 14.57
Maximum Hourly Wage 17.81
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